An evaluation of alternative transfer designs for the Nicaraguan Red de Protecci??n Social by Meyer, Jennifer A.
 AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER DESIGNS 
FOR THE NICARAGUAN RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
JENNIFER A MEYER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Agricultural and Applied Economics 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Adviser:  
 
 Associate Professor Mary Arends-Kuenning
ii 
Abstract: 
This paper applies a micro-simulation method to evaluate the effects of the transfer design of a 
conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua for households with two eligible children. The 
paper then exploits evidence from the experimental implementation of the Red de Protección 
program to validate its behavioral model and method simulation. After validating its methods, 
the paper simulates alternative program designs. The simulation of alternative programs suggests 
that delivering benefits on a per-child basis or unconditionally will lower attendance rates 
relative to the original RPS program, which delivered its benefits at the household level. The 
paper concludes by discussing possible mechanisms driving the simulated results and the 
contributions and limitations of ex-ante evaluation methods.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Nicaragua remains one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere, falling behind only 
Haiti in GDP per capita. The country faces some of the lowest literacy and school enrollment 
rates in Latin America with lower rates of schooling in rural areas than in urban areas (World 
Bank 2003). According to the 2001 Living Standards and Measurement Survey, over 22% of 
children in rural areas between the ages of 7 and 13 were not enrolled in school, 64% of whom 
cited a need for work, a lack of income, or the high costs of schooling as the primary reason for 
not enrolling in school. In the departments of Madriz and Matagalpa, the regions about which 
this study is concerned, nearly 18% of children between the ages of 7 and 13 are not enrolled in 
school, 67% citing money concerns as the primary reason for not enrolling.  
 In order to combat the problems of low educational attainment and short-term poverty, 
the government of Nicaragua implemented the conditional cash transfer program Red de 
Protección Social (RPS) for the alleviation of short-term poverty and the creation of incentives 
to invest in human capital such as health and schooling to aid long-term growth. This program 
provided household transfers to the primary caretaker of children conditional on the schooling of 
children aged 7 to 13 and health checkups for children younger than 5. 
 Although the fertility rates in Nicaragua were decreasing in the decade before the 
implementation of the program, the program was designed so as to prevent the creation of 
distorted fertility incentives. RPS provided transfers for compliance with program conditions at 
the household level.  The generosity of the benefits for health investments was independent of 
the size of the household, and the generosity of the benefits for schooling investments was 
independent of the number of children for whom schooling was required. While delivering 
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benefits at the household level might limit unintended demographic externalities (Stecklov 
2007), this program design naturally creates disadvantages for larger families’ participation in 
the program. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the per-household payment design for two-
child families through the lens of the economics of the family in order to understand how CCTs 
interact with household decision-making behavior. I then present how households might respond 
to and participate in alternative program designs. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
 
1.2.1 SUCCESS AND JUSTIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER 
PROGRAMS 
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) have become a popular tool in the development arena in the 
last decade, acting as a social safety net in the short-term and incentivizing long-term 
investments that can aid economic growth. ―[By] encompassing various dimensions of human 
capital, including nutritional status, health, and education, [CCTs] are able to influence many of 
the key indicators highlighted in national poverty reduction strategies‖ (Maluccio and Flores 
2005 p. 1). Conditional cash transfers have caught the attention of development practitioners, 
national governments, and the research community. The programs have been seen as a versatile 
tool in reaching disadvantaged households and largely successful in increasing the rates of short-
term food security and school enrollment (Fiszbein et al 2004). Because many CCT programs 
have been implemented successfully as an experimental field trial, they have also expanded the 
set of opportunities available for rigorous impact evaluation (Maluccio and Flores 2005, 
Skoufias 2005, Glewwe and Olinto 2004). The results of these impact evaluations have indicated 
that many of these programs have been successful in alleviating short-term poverty (Fiszbein et 
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al 2004), inducing human capital investments (Fiszbein et al 2004), and expanding what 
economists know about the application of their economic tools (Todd and Wolpin 2006; 
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago 2009; and Azevedo, Bouillon, and Yáñez-Pagans 2009). The 
success of early CCT programs was followed by the rapid spread of their use in other countries. 
Indeed, conditional cash transfers are now present in nearly every country in Latin America. The 
prevalence of the programs across countries has increased alongside the expansion of already 
existing programs. 
 The justification for conditional cash transfer programs largely relies on the critical role 
that human capital investments play in the growth of nations (Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago 
2009) and in breaking cycles of intergenerational poverty. Although investments in education 
and nutrition are critical to the economic well-being of individuals and the growth of nations, 
market failures can make household investment in capital difficult, especially for the poor. While 
parental preferences or other factors might explain educational deficits in developing countries, it 
is much more likely a problem of deep poverty, of supply, or of credit constraints (Basu 1998, 
Fiszbein et al 2004). Failures in credit market functioning create a binding constraint on the poor 
seeking to invest in the education of their children. Without access to credit, the poor are unable 
to invest in human capital without reducing current consumption in a way that is unbearable. 
CCTs, then, act as a form of redistribution that lifts these credit constraints (Fiszbein et al 2004) 
and allows for long-term investments in human capital. Market failures can lead to inequalities 
both across households and within households. Children in credit-constrained households must 
compete with one another for scarce resources. For instance, a within-family evaluation of 
schooling indicates that boys are less likely to attend school relative to girls in Nicaragua 
(Dammert 2010). This disparity in educational outcomes by gender might reflect differences in 
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household preferences, opportunity costs (Dammert 2008), or differences in future earnings 
potential (Rangel 2008). Intra-household competition for resources in credit-constrained 
households leads to a need for conditional cash transfers to address not only inter-household 
inequalities but also intra-household inequalities.  
One of the earliest conditional cash transfer programs was the Mexican Programa de 
Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (PROGRESA), implemented in 1997. PROGRESA, renamed 
Oportunidades in 2001, initially served 300,000 rural households but has since expanded to 
cover 5 million households in both urban and rural areas in Mexico (Fiszbein et al 2004). The 
program changes the opportunity costs of sending a child to school in the short term by providing 
a transfer conditional on the investment in the human capital of children. The design relies 
heavily on economic theory, offering more generous benefits to girls who, prior to the program, 
attended school at disproportionately low rates. Furthermore, the program provides larger 
transfers for secondary school students than for primary school students because secondary 
school students face higher opportunity costs of schooling. This program has also been extolled 
by policymakers and researchers for making program evaluation an important focus of its 
implementation. Indeed, this program has generated much interest from researchers who have 
taken advantage of the rich cross-sectional data and the multiple waves of surveys that have been 
collected. The evaluative component of the program has raised the standards for rigorous policy 
analysis and has provided opportunities for the advancement of econometric tools in the 
discipline. Many of the CCTs implemented after 1997, including RPS, have borrowed elements 
of the design of PROGRESA.  
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1.2.2 RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL 
 
Modeling upon the Mexican PROGRESA in rural Mexico, the Nicaraguan government piloted a 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, Red de Protección Social (RPS) in 2000.  Its aim was 
twofold: the reduction of present poverty through increased food security and the reduction of 
future poverty through increased human capital investment. The food security component 
provided eligible households with a bi-monthly cash transfer, called the bono alimentario, 
conditional on a household member’s attendance at educational workshops and the attendance of 
children under age 5 at preventive health care appointments. In September 2000, the annual cash 
transfer was US$224
1
 (C$ 2,880), or approximately 13% of total annual household expenditures 
(Nicaragua 2005). The second component of the RPS program was an educational cash transfer, 
called the bono escolar, intended to induce a household’s investment in child schooling. Eligible 
households received a bi-monthly fixed cash transfer conditional on the enrollment and regular 
attendance of children between the ages of 7 and 13 who had not yet completed the fourth grade. 
Additionally, the program provided an annual lump sum transfer for school supplies and 
uniforms for each eligible child in the household enrolled in school, called the mochila escolar. 
In September 2000, the annual school attendance transfer and the annual school supplies transfer 
were US$112 (C$1,440) per household and US$21 (C$275) per child per year, respectively 
(IFPRI 2005).  
The program included a supply-side component as well. Because teachers were likely to 
bear some costs of the program in the form of increased class sizes and administrative duties, the 
program offered a bono a la oferta to teachers. This transfer was delivered by children 
participating in the program. The teachers could keep half of the transfer while the school kept 
the other half. Maluccio, Murphy, and Regalia (2009) discusses supply-side improvements that 
                                                          
1
 The exchange rate was C$12.85 to US$1 in September of 2000.  
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include increased availability of schooling such as increased grade availability and more school 
sessions, especially in underserved areas.  
 
 
1.2.3 PROGRAM TARGETING 
 
The targeting of the Nicaraguan RPS was based on poverty indices as its objectives were to 
alleviate both short-term and long-term poverty. Low educational attainment is overwhelmingly 
associated with low incomes, but alternative targeting mechanisms such as mother’s education or 
assets are unlikely to generate the same group of beneficiaries as targeting mechanisms based on 
poverty indicators.  
 In the design phase, the geographic targeting of RPS initially designated all rural areas as 
eligible for the program. The program was then designed to be implemented in the departments 
of Madriz and Matagalpa, both of which exhibited high levels of extreme poverty, good access to 
schools and health posts, ease of communication, and a strong central institutional capacity. In 
Madriz and Matagalpa, approximately 80% of the population was poor and half of the poor were 
living in extreme poverty. Rural Madriz was on average poorer than Matagalpa. Municipalities 
were then chosen based on the same set of criteria used at the department level: high levels of 
poverty with the necessary infrastructure to effectively carry out the program. The final phase of 
the geographic targeting was the identification of the localities which were to receive the 
program. Fifty-nine localities were grouped based on the construction of a marginality index. 
This index was a weighted average of items that are associated with poverty:  
1. Average family size (10%) 
2. Percent without piped water in the home or yard (50%) 
3. Percent without a latrine (10%) 
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4. Percent of persons over age 5 who are illiterate. (30%) 
These marginality indices were then used to classify the 59 rural localities into groups 
based on levels of impoverishment. Forty-two of the highest-priority localities were chosen to 
receive the program, 21 of which received the program in 2001. The remaining 21 localities 
received the program 2 years after the initial implementation. At the household level, only a 
small number of households were excluded from program benefits. Households that did not 
appear to be in extreme poverty, as indicated by owning a vehicle or owning more than 20 
manzanas (1 manzana is equivalent to approximately 1.7 acres.) of land, were excluded. 
Additionally, households comprised of a single person or a childless couple without disability, 
with significant economic resources or a business, or with falsified census information were 
excluded. Lastly, a small portion of eligible households chose not to participate in the program. 
In total, the program served 89.6% of those eligible (Maluccio 2009).   
 
1.2.4 PREVIOUS WORK EVALUATING RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL 
 
Maluccio and Flores (2005) conducted a program evaluation using difference-in-differences 
techniques to find that RPS increased household total annual expenditures, increased per capita 
expenditures, increased the school enrollment of children aged 7-13, increased the school 
attendance of children aged 7-13, increased the school advancement for children aged 7-13 in 
extremely poor and poor households, decreased the prevalence of working as a primary or 
secondary activity for children aged 7-13, decreased child stunting for children under age 5, and 
decreased the percentage of children under age 5 who were underweight. Dammert (2009) 
provides evidence that RPS provided a larger impact on schooling for the poorest localities in 
2001 but smaller impacts for the poorest localities in 2002 relative to richer localities. 
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Additionally, the program had a greater impact on expenditures for wealthier households. 
Maluccio, Murphy, and Regalia (2009) find that supply-side improvements of schooling 
conditions such as the grade availability, number of teachers, and number of sessions per day 
effectively improved grade progression. They add that conditional cash transfer programs were 
more effective in raising the levels of grade progression in schools that had autonomy in school 
management and instruction. Another study by Maluccio (2009) finds that RPS had low rates of 
undercoverage and leakage, suggesting that their targeting mechanisms were effective in 
reaching the poorest households. Caldes and Maluccio (2005) apply a theory of evaluating cost-
efficiency to RPS and conclude that excluding fixed costs from an analysis of cost-effectiveness 
is a logical approach in considering program continuation. RPS does not have significantly 
different impacts for households with less female bargaining power, although RPS appears to be 
less effective in increasing child enrollment in households in which the female has much more 
bargaining power than the male (Gitter and Barham 2008). A study by Olinto and Nielson (2006) 
finds that RPS transfers crowded out private transfers from NGOs but had no effect on 
remittances. RPS also acted as a safety net for households affected by the coffee crisis in 
Nicaragua (Maluccio 2005). RPS was not found to increase investment in long-term productive 
investments other than human capital (Maluccio 2010).  
 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objective of this paper is to explore the impacts of the Nicaraguan RPS’s per-
household transfer scheme on households with two eligible children. Other objectives include the 
following: 
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1. Constructing a model that simulates the child schooling decision for households with two 
children who are eligible for the Nicaraguan conditional cash transfer program, Red de 
Protección Social. 
2. Validating and discussing the predictive power of this model by comparing attendance 
and enrollment rates using experimental data from the implementation of the RPS 
program. 
3. Presenting and discussing alternative program designs and their simulated impacts.  
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study adds to the literature on simulation methods by modeling the schooling decision for 
multiple children largely using reduced-form methods and an experiment for validation. This 
study also provides evidence for future CCT programs or revisions of current implementations of 
CCT programs. This study provides an examination of the impacts the per-household transfer of 
the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social. Recent literature has found that households use 
specialization in the time allocation of children in order to maintain a level of subsistence (del 
Carpio and Macours 2009). Consequently, whether a CCT program requires changes to patterns 
of specialization should take an important role in the design of these programs. This study 
provides evidence that will help policymakers understand and evaluate the costs and trade-offs 
associated with such program designs. As CCTs have been identified as a powerful tool in 
reaching the Millennium Development Goal of reaching universal primary education by 2015, 
studies examining the appropriate and most effective design are critical to ensuring that the 
children most vulnerable to low educational attainment are reached and benefit from social 
programs.  
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1.5 HYPOTHESIS 
Could the Red de Protección Social have increased its effectiveness by removing the all-or-
nothing condition of primary-aged children’s enrollment and regular attendance in school? 
Answering this question relies on an understanding of how the features of the program interact 
with the decision-making behavior of households regarding the schooling of eligible children. 
Households that choose to send neither of their children to school in the absence of a CCT 
program might find that the opportunity costs of sending both children to school are too high and 
consequently persist in the non-schooling of their children in the presence of a CCT. If these 
households could optimize their utility function by sending one child to school while keeping the 
other in the household, the CCT could be more effective in raising the schooling rates than it is 
with the flat per-household transfer. However, high costs of schooling in general, because of 
high transportation costs or a high need for labor, would suggest that the benefit level is 
inadequate rather than that the structure of the conditionality is inappropriate. Alternatively, a 
per-child transfer might lower schooling rates if the all-or-nothing condition reduced how 
households favor one eligible child over another. If, for instance, a household prefers to have one 
child specialize in schooling because of a natural aptitude for learning or higher returns to 
education, a per-child transfer might allow these intra-household inequalities in educational 
investment to persist, while participation in a program with a flat transfer at the household level 
requires the end of such inequalities.  
 
1.6 OUTLINE 
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the literature regarding 
the economics of the household, explaining the idea of intra-household inequalities in 
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educational investments, the relationships between family size and schooling, the role and 
methods of ex-ante evaluations. This literature provides insight into how a conditional cash 
transfer program might interact with the economics of the household. Chapter 3 introduces a 
behavioral model of the household and the methods of micro-simulation used in this study. 
Chapter 4 then simulates household participation in RPS as it was originally implemented. It 
then presents the results of this simulation and provides evidence that the behavioral model 
applied gives reasonable estimates of household participation in the conditional cash transfer 
program in Nicaragua. Relying on the evidence from the validation of the model in chapter 4, 
chapter 5 introduces new program parameters into the established behavioral model to simulate 
alternative program designs. The simulation of alternative programs suggests that delivering 
benefits on a per-child basis or unconditionally will lower attendance rates relative to the original 
RPS program. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of policy implications, conclusions, and 
future research. Chapter 7 presents the tables and figures discussed in the paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION OF SCHOOLING EXPENDITURES, 
FAMILY STRUCTURE, AND GENDER  
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) construct a simulation model that allows for the analysis 
of all children that are eligible for a program, but their model does not address how households 
make the simultaneous decision about multiple children’s schooling. This paper is intended to 
complement their work by accounting for interactions between eligible children within a 
household, which have consistently been found in the literature. However, it is limited in 
comparison because it only examines households with two eligible children, excluding 
households with only one child and households with 3 or more eligible children.  
 Thomas, Schoeni, and Strauss (2006) find that mothers and fathers invest in sons and 
daughters differently. While the early literature had suggested that income was pooled at the 
household level, they find evidence that this hypothesis is not true in Brazil. If, for instance, 
parents pooled resources and then determined the schooling of sons and daughters whose present 
discounted value of schooling differed, both parents would invest in the schooling of the same 
child. However, they find that maternal education affects the schooling of sons and daughters 
differently than paternal education does. Their finding suggests that a mother who wishes to 
invest in her children’s education will have success that depends on the extent to which she can 
exert her preferences. This finding is a particularly important one to consider in the case of 
CCTs, as most of the transfers are made to women in the household. If the transfer is effective in 
changing the extent to which a woman can exert her preferences, there are likely to be 
implications for the welfare of children that cannot be explained by using only changes in 
income.  
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 Parish and Willis (1993) shed light on the sources of intra-household inequalities in 
schooling investments across sons and daughters in Taiwan. They present a model of credit-
constrained households and conditional altruism, which suggests that family investments in 
schooling are credit constrained. Because parents make the investment decisions about their 
children, schooling status of children is heavily influenced by family decision-making behaviors. 
The theory of the household suggests that family structure, gender, and birth order play a 
significant role in the decision about a particular child’s schooling. Sawada and Lokshin (2009) 
present a model in which household decision-makers determine allocations of resources across 
time and secondarily across children who compete for these resources for schooling. They 
suggest that the separability assumption for the decision involving the schooling of multiple 
children fails to hold in Pakistan. In particular, they find that older brothers help support the 
schooling of younger siblings through income contributions while older sisters help support the 
schooling of younger siblings though domestic contributions. Similarly, Ayalew (2005) finds 
that educational investments in Ethiopia tend to reinforce differences between siblings, 
suggesting that the endowment of ability in one child affects the educational investments in her 
siblings. The study rejects the premise that the educational investment decision is separable 
across siblings. Yamauchi (2006) finds that households tend to spend more money on schooling 
for unhealthy children to reduce inequality across siblings in South Africa. Himaz (2010) 
compares the education expenditures of households composed of children that are approximately 
the same age but different genders to find that intra-household discrimination exists and favors 
boys in Sri Lanka. The intra-household differences in educational expenditures can most often be 
attributed to differential enrollment rates between boys and girls. An article by Kingdon (2002) 
finds that gender bias in India is attributable to both lower earnings potential for women in the 
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labor market (which reduces the returns to the educational investment) and to discrimination in 
the household. In particular, she finds that girls are more likely to bear the costs of severe 
poverty through domestic labor that crowds out schooling. Furthermore, another paper which 
uses data from Brazil finds that the education of mothers and fathers have differential impacts on 
sons’ and daughters’ propensities to work, suggesting that a unitary household model is an 
inappropriate assumption for modeling child labor (Emerson and Souza 2002). Overall, the 
literature suggests that the particular mechanics of the schooling decision within a household 
vary by the composition of the household, labor market prospects, and the geographic location in 
which a study was performed.  
Del Carpio and Macours (2009) explore how the time allocations of children vary in the 
presence of a conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua. They note that boys and girls 
generally participate in different kinds of activities, and these activities vary in their propensity 
to crowd out schooling. Certain activities might even be seen as complementary to schooling. 
The authors find that while specialization exists for children, time spent in the labor market is not 
significantly different between boys and girls. Boys tend to work in agriculture where working 
largely occurs during school hours, crowding out schooling. Therefore, labor tends to act as a 
substitute for schooling for boys in Nicaragua.  
 In general, how poverty and child labor are related is unclear. Basu (1998) presents a 
subsistence axiom that suggests that parents will always choose to keep their children out of the 
labor market unless the family relies on child income to maintain an adequate level of 
consumption. Other models of child time allocation involve a utility-maximization component, 
which I will apply in this paper. In this model, children’s time might be allocated to market or 
domestic work as child labor is the optimal decision for the household. 
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 Knowing how a household allocates children’s time is instrumental in building a program 
that most effectively increases enrollment. Opportunity costs, scarce resources, binding credit 
constraints, low supply, differential costs and returns to schooling across boys and girls are likely 
to play a role and affect which children are schooled in a household. An all-or-nothing 
arrangement, such as is the case for RPS, may exclude the most vulnerable families from 
receiving any of the program’s benefits. However, this same all-or-nothing program design 
might change the opportunity costs for disadvantaged children within a household and lower 
educational differentials by gender. On the other hand, a per-child transfer scheme might 
increase the schooling of some children from the households unable to invest in the schooling of 
all of their children. This scheme might, however, allow a household to reinforce intra-household 
allocations that reduce the future welfare of a particular school-aged child. If households desire 
to transfer resources to children but are faced with scarce resources, an unconditional transfer 
might be sufficient to reduce the prevalence of these tough choices about which children attend 
school and which do not.  
 
2.2 THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY SIZE ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND 
ENROLLMENT  
Whether family size plays an important role in the educational investments of children is an 
important factor in designing a CCT program. RPS gives a flat benefit to all households 
conditional on the enrollment and regular attendance of all children aged 7 to 13, regardless of 
the number of children eligible. RPS’s payment structure provides a generous benefit but 
disregards the higher costs of schooling faced by families with more children -- families who 
tend to have fewer resources anyway. This design might limit the effectiveness of the program if 
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families with more eligible children face higher costs of schooling than smaller families. On the 
other hand, this payment design might make sense if larger households have children that 
specialize in labor activities in order to support the schooling of children who specialize in 
education. In the latter case, a current design of the CCT might help reduce inequalities that exist 
in the household.   
Early literature explained the lower rates of schooling of children from larger families by 
the dilution of household resources for education. Resource dilution is often considered in the 
sociology literature and explains that children will face increased competition for a scarce 
quantity of resources with the addition of family members. Hanushek (1992) develops three 
models of parental time allocation in the household using the idea of a child quantity-quality 
trade-off. In his modeling, achievement falls with increasing family size.   
Empirical evidence that ignores the simultaneity of the family size and educational 
attainment of the children in the household suggests that family size is correlated with lower 
schooling outcomes. In India, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) identify a negative correlation 
between schooling and family size. Family size had no effect on schooling in Korea (Lee 2008). 
Booth and Kee (2009) find that children with more siblings obtain less education. Schmeer 
(2009) finds that sibship size and the timing of changes in sibship size has an important effect on 
the education of children in the household in the Philippines. Newer evidence using twins and 
the gender composition of children (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005), however, suggests 
family size effects may not be accurately captured in these models. Instead, the study posits that 
larger families are fundamentally different than smaller families. 
The activities of siblings are also important in predicting a child’s schooling. Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos (1997) provide an exploration of the effects of family size and sibling activities 
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on school enrollment for children in Peru. They find that family size is important in predicting 
schooling activities for children. Additionally, they find that the particular activities of siblings 
are important, citing that the number of siblings not in school plays an important role in the 
determination of a child’s probability of enrollment. More younger siblings increases the 
likelihood of a child working domestically in such a way that crowds out schooling. 
 
2.3 PROGRAM DESIGN AND DELIVERY 
 
The generosity and structure of the benefit systems vary dramatically across programs; a 
comparison of the Nicaraguan RPS program and the Honduran Programa de Asignación 
Familiar (PRAF) provides an illustrative example. RPS’s transfer amounts to nearly 30% of 
household expenditures and PRAF’s transfer amounts to only 7% (Fiszbein et al 2009). Both the 
Honduran PRAF and the Nicaraguan RPS program reported positive schooling outcomes. 
However, the Nicaraguan program’s impact on schooling outcomes was much larger than the 
Honduran program’s impact. In fact, the RPS program delivered both the most generous benefits 
of the Latin American programs and also reported the largest impact on enrollment (Fiszbein et 
al 2009). With limited resources available for the implementation of these programs, methods for 
the optimization of program design are important for ensuring that programs are designed in the 
most cost-effective manner. 
Evaluations of targeting methods, benefit levels and structures, payment delivery design, 
and conditionality of transfers have relied on the empirical evidence a wide variety of conditional 
cash transfer programs. Much variation exists between programs. Table 1 presents how different 
programs structure their benefits. 
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As shown in the table, how benefits are related to the number of children or the age, 
gender, or grade level of a child varies across programs. While some programs distribute flat 
transfers at the household-level, others adjust payment levels according to the size of the 
household. The educational conditions for receiving these benefits vary as well. While the 
Nicaraguan program delivered benefits upon meeting all of the conditions for all children, 
programs in Honduras and Mexico delivered benefits if the educational conditions were met for 
any single child. The Mexican Oportunidades transferred a flat benefit for each child who met 
minimum attendance rates. They capped the level of transfer per household. Similarly, the 
Honduran PRAF delivered a benefit for each child that met the educational conditions capping 
the number of eligible children at three (Stecklov 2007).  
 
2.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN PROGRAM DESIGN AND DELIVERY  
2.4.1 EX-POST AND EX-ANTE: THEORIES OF IMPACT EVALUATION  
To identify a precise estimate of the impact of a program on an individual’s outcomes, it is 
necessary to know the schooling outcomes for a treated person (a beneficiary of RPS) and the 
outcomes for the same person had she not been treated (called the counterfactual). Obviously, the 
researcher is unable observe both outcomes for a single person (Angrist and Pischke 2009) as a 
person cannot be both treated and untreated. Experiments construct counterfactuals by randomly 
selecting certain individuals to receive a treatment and randomly selecting a comparable group of 
individuals to be excluded from the same treatment. The group not receiving the treatment serves 
as the counterfactual for the group that did receive the treatment. If the two groups are 
statistically similar at the baseline and there was no differential attrition between the groups, the 
difference in the outcomes after the treatment serves as the estimated impact of the program. 
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While most papers analyzing CCTs use the experimental evidence from field trials to lend 
insight into the problem of the effects of programs, most CCTs do not vary program conditions, 
eligibility, or benefit structures across treated groups. In cases where an experiment which alters 
the parameter of interest (the number of children necessary to receive a benefit, in this instance) 
did not take place, researchers have used simulation techniques in order to simulate a 
counterfactual to compare to the observed program. Simulations differ from experimental 
estimates of program impact by constructing the counterfactual (the group of people ―receiving‖ 
the program) and comparing it to the control group (the same group of people who are observed 
to have not received the program). The following segment of literature uses these simulation 
techniques to construct a counterfactual and examine the impacts of program with particular 
parameters of interest. A simulation is necessary for the question of interest as the proposed 
program alternative was not observed, eliminating the possibility of ex-post analysis. Similarly, a 
simulation is preferable to a cross-program analysis as it preserves the context in which a 
particular program design was implemented. 
 
2.4.2 EX-POST EVALUATIONS OF CCT PROGRAM DESIGN AND DELIVERY 
 A limited number of papers address the effect of program generosity on schooling 
outcomes. Filmer and Schady (2010) use regression discontinuity analysis for 6
th
 graders 
enrolling in 7
th
 grade in Cambodia. The program offered a more generous scholarship for 
students at higher risk of dropping out. They find that a larger transfer’s impact was not 
significantly different from the impact of the smaller transfer’s impact. However, their evaluation 
design only allows for the estimate of the impact of benefit generosity at the discontinuity and 
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does not allow for an evaluation of the effects of a more generous benefit given to the student 
most at-risk of dropping out.  
 Baird, McIntosh, and Ӧzler (2009) use an experiment in South Africa to understand the 
impacts of different program designs. Their study analyzed the impact of a program designed to 
provide experimental evidence on transfer size, transfer conditionality, and transfer recipient. 
They do not find a significant change in effects by changing the size of the transfer at the 
household level. Instead, they do find that girls are responsive to increases in transfer size when 
the transfer is conditional and made directly to the schoolgirl. They also find that transferring the 
largest proportion of a household transfer directly to a schoolgirl conditionally is more effective 
than transferring the largest proportion of a household transfer directly to the mother of the 
household. The study fails to find a significantly different effect across households that receive 
the transfer conditionally relative to households that receive the transfer unconditionally.  
 
2.4.3 EX-ANTE EVALUATIONS OF CCT PROGRAM DESIGN AND DELIVERY 
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) identify two sources of inefficiencies in CCT design. The first 
inefficiency is the result of providing an educational transfer to a household that would have 
enrolled its children in school without the transfer. The second inefficiency is offering a transfer 
that is either larger or smaller than what is necessary to induce child enrollment. Using Mexico’s 
PROGRESA as a case study, they simulate alternative program designs in order to maximize the 
probability of a child attending school. Their identification strategy relies on the existence of the 
household transfer cap which limits the amount of total benefits a household can receive. They 
restrict their analysis to the secondary school decision. They maximize the treatment effect of the 
conditional cash transfer by selecting eligibility requirements and level of transfer so as to 
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maximize the difference between the probability of school enrollment for a student who receives 
a benefit and the probability of school enrollment for the same student who does not receive a 
benefit. This optimization problem is constrained by the government’s budget constraint. The 
results of the formulation provide children with a low initial probability of enrollment a high 
level of cash transfer. Similarly, the results provide children with a high initial probability of 
enrollment a low level of cash transfer or suggest that they be ineligible for the transfer.  
Many of the simulations of changes to the benefit system of a conditional cash transfer 
rely on observed child wages as a proxy for the opportunity cost of a child’s time (Todd and 
Wolpin 2006, Azevedo et al 2009, Attanasio 2009). Todd and Wolpin (2006) use a structural 
model based on Mexico’s PROGRESA to identify the impacts of alternative program designs. 
They use a simple behavioral model of the relationships among observed wages, costs of 
schooling, time use, fertility, and the schooling decisions across households with similar 
characteristics. Relying on the assumption that changes in the child schooling decision occur 
only through changes in household income and child wages, the authors propose using matching 
methods for an ex-ante evaluation. They suggest comparing ―treated‖ households to control 
households by artificially constructing ―treated‖ households within the observed control group 
from the initial experiment. They rely on the results of the experimental implementation of the 
program to validate their model. Their study uses a dynamic model of the household to track the 
household schooling decision as well as the household fertility decision. 
Azevedo et al (2009) expand on the work of Todd and Wolpin to include a matching 
method to evaluate the way in which households adjust the working hours of children in order to 
meet the conditions of the program. Their study also uses data from the urban component of the 
Mexican conditional cash transfer program – Oportunidades. In effect, their model does not 
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require that schooling and labor be mutually exclusive choices for children. This work echoes the 
conclusions found in de Janvry and Sadoulet, suggesting that the Mexican CCT could more be 
effective and efficient by reducing the transfer made to primary school children and increasing 
the transfer made to secondary school children.  
Attanasio et al’s (2010) simulation accounts for potential general equilibrium effects on 
child wages and find that the increase in child schooling does indeed raise local child wages. 
Thomas (2010) constructs a semi-parametric model of household behavior to evaluate alternative 
program designs of the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social. Her analysis performs a simulation 
on the treatment of the baseline cross-section rather than on control areas as in Todd and 
Wolpin’s analysis and uses costs of schooling as a proxy for the opportunity cost of a child’s 
time.  
I will follow the methods of Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) to analyze the 
Nicaraguan conditional cash transfer program. They use parametric methods to analyze 
alternative program designs for the Bolsa Escola program in Brazil. They use mostly reduced-
form equations in an ex-ante analysis and forecast that the conditionality of transfers is important 
for having the maximum impact on schooling. Their study, however, necessarily ignores 
interactions between eligible children. Therefore, applying this model to a conditional cash 
transfer program does not allow analysts to answer questions regarding whether transfers should 
be delivered at the household or child level or how benefits should vary with the number of 
children eligible for the program. This study drops the assumption that there is no interaction 
between eligible siblings and therefore allows for analysis of these questions. The paper by 
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) predicts that the Bolsa Escola program would indeed 
have a large effect on enrollment and an even greater impact for households in the lower end of 
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the income distribution. Using their behavioral model, they then simulate the effect of the 
program on the incidence of poverty in Brazil to find that the program would have only a modest 
effect. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL METHODS 
 
3.1 A UTILITY-MAXIMIZING HOUSEHOLD  
 
The model used is a simple household utility-maximization problem for households with 2 
eligible children. A household maximizes its utility, a function of the schooling status of eligible 
children and of consumption, by choosing from one of four schooling decisions for the two 
eligible children: both children attend school, neither child attends school, only the younger child 
attends school, or only the older child attends school. These decisions are subject to the budget 
constraints of the household and the time constraints of the children. More formally, the 
household maximization problem is as follows.   
 
           (Sj, C; W, X, Z) 
subject to T = ∑       j
 
     + ∑       j
 
     
and Y-i +  ∑      j
 
     = C 
 
Utility is given as a function of the schooling status of children aged 7 to 13 (Sj) and 
consumption (C) for the household, given vectors of child (X), household (Z), and community 
(W) characteristics. Sj is an index of dummy variables for that are equal to one according to the 
schooling status of eligible children. The index Sj is defined as follows: neither child is sent to 
school (j = 0), both children are sent to school (j = 1), only the younger child is sent to school (j 
= 2), or only the older child is sent to school (j = 3). 
According to the time constraint, the total time available for eligible children in the 
household, T, is divided between time spent in school under each occupational choice, Tsj, and 
time spent out of school, Twj. For example, Ts0 is the total time spent in school for both eligible 
children who do not attend school and is equal to zero. In this model, T, Tsj, and Twj are 
 25 
exogenous to the household. In other words, for each schooling choice Sj, the model assumes a 
fixed number of hours for schooling and a fixed numbers of hours for working. The household 
does not choose the combination of hours spent in each activity.  
According to the budget constraint, household consumption is determined by household 
income and the household’s schooling decision which determines the subsequent labor response 
of the children. A household’s choice of Sj determines the income contribution of eligible 
children. In this model, Y-i is exogenous to the household and is the household income net of 
total eligible child income contributions yj in each occupational state. Because a child that goes 
to school spends less time working, a school-going child will contribute less to household 
income relative to the child that does not attend school. Therefore, sending a child to school 
decreases the level of consumption that a household realizes through changes in the income 
constraint. 
In the presence of a conditional cash transfer program, the household’s utility-
maximization problem is altered by the income from the program conditional on the household’s 
participation in that program. The new utility-maximization problem for eligible households is as 
follows:  
 
           (Sj, C; W, X, Z) 
subject to T = ∑        
 
     + ∑        
 
     
and Y-i + ∑       
 
     + (θ + 2ρ)*S1 + η = C 
 
The household maximizes utility by choosing the schooling status of eligible children given the 
income and time constraints of the household. In the presence of the conditional cash transfer 
program, the utility derived from sending both children to school is adjusted according to the 
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gains from the educational transfer, which includes the bono escolar, θ, and the mochila escolar 
for each child, ρ. This simulation assumes that every household meets the conditions and 
receives the bono alimentario, η.  
 After empirically specifying and validating this model of the household with and without 
the RPS program, I can adjust the payment design to a per-child transfer program, an 
unconditional transfer, and a transfer twice as large as the original and compare the results.  
 
3.2 SIMULATION MODEL  
 
This paper uses simulation techniques to predict household behavioral responses in the presence 
of alternative program designs. Although the successful randomized implementation allows for a 
rigorous impact evaluation of certain components of the program, other questions are 
unanswerable with ex-post techniques. Ex-post evaluations are ill-equipped to answer questions 
about what might have happened in Nicaragua under changes in the generosity of the transfer, 
conditionality of the transfer, or benefit delivery. Alternative programs were not implemented as 
an experiment, and, therefore, the gold-standard analysis of experimental evaluation is infeasible. 
Predicting the impacts of alternative programs requires that a researcher have an in-depth 
understanding of the particular mechanisms that drive the household behavioral response in the 
presence of the CCT program. If the researcher accurately identifies and models these 
mechanisms, he can then predict the household behavioral response in the presence of alternative 
CCT programs by modeling counterfactuals. Human behavior and household decision-making, 
however, are complex phenomena, and modeling all of the nuances of an individual’s 
preferences is an unreasonable task. Consequently, experimental trials and quasi-experimental 
evaluation have gained an appropriate popularity. In the absence of experimental evidence, an 
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analysis of anticipated impacts requires using a set of assumptions that reduces the intricate 
utility-maximizing behavior of a household to a choice among discrete options that can be 
modeled. The plausibility of these necessary assumptions, the advantages of ex-ante evaluations, 
and the limitations of this particular analysis are presented in greater depth in a later chapter.  
Recent papers (Todd and Wolpin 2006 and Azevedo et al 2009) construct fully structural 
models to identify the mechanisms of the household behavioral response to PROGRESA in 
Mexico. In this simulation, I rely on reduced-form methods as much as possible and generally 
only make assumptions about the labor response of eligible children, the labor response of 
household wage earners, and the earnings potential of children. The model makes no claims 
about whether decision-making behavior is unitary or collective within the household; it only 
reflects the result of whatever decision-making process did in fact occur at the household level as 
in Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003). Specifically, I rely on the following claims for this 
analysis, which generally follow those of Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003):  
I. No selection into the labor market exists for eligible children. In other words, a 
child’s non-school time is equally valuable whether spent in the home or in the labor 
market.
2
  
II. The time allocation of ineligible children in the household is exogenous to the 
program. The time allocation decision for eligible children is modeled, and it is 
assumed that the schooling decision is made simultaneously across eligible siblings. 
III. The fertility decision of the household is exogenous to the program.  
IV. Wage earners who are not eligible for the program make their time allocation 
decisions independently of the time allocation decision of eligible children.
3
 
                                                          
2
 Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) provide evidence that a similar assumption likely holds for children aged 
10 to 15 in Brazil. Their paper does not make this assumption directly but infers the relationship between the value 
of work in the home and work in the labor market using ex-ante evaluation methods. 
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V. If a household sends both children to school, the total labor (household labor or 
market labor) allocated to eligible children is split equally between the two eligible 
children.  
Because I observe the effects of the experimental trial, I can compare the predictions 
obtained using these assumptions to what was observed in the experiment. This comparison will 
be useful for considering the predictive power of the model and thus the reliability of results 
obtained from the simulation of alternative programs. This comparison will not necessarily prove 
that the model used has correctly identified the mechanics of household decision-making, but it 
can provide evidence of whether the simple model of household decision-making used generates 
similar results to the experimental evidence that the actual treatment generated. If the 
experimental evidence suggests that the simplified model used generates comparable results, the 
model might then be appropriate for the simulation of alternative program designs. Chapter 4 of 
this paper compares the simulated results to the experimental results and discusses whether the 
assumptions used can closely model the response of households to the CCT program in rural 
Nicaragua. Chapter 5 then changes the parameters of the model to simulate the anticipated 
response of households to alternative program designs.  
I use the multinomial logit to model how a household chooses from a set of discrete 
options. Because the sample is limited to households with 2 eligible children, I can identify a set 
of finite occupational choices (indexed j) for a household (indexed i) while still capturing the 
presence of household specialization for children. While the model is not specifically applied to 
households with more than 2 eligible children, it is not obvious that patterns of intra-household 
allocation of educational investments would vary dramatically for families with more eligible 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3
 Maluccio and Flores (2005) find that households receiving the RPS transfer spend less time in the labor market 
than control households, suggesting that wage earners might be influenced by the time allocation of eligible 
children.  
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children. The multinomial logit estimates the propensity of household i to choose occupational 
outcome j over an arbitrarily assigned base outcome. It is appropriate for this problem as the 
alternatives within the choice set are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and finite (Train 2009). The 
occupational choices for this model are indexed as follows:  
A. j = 0 reflects the household choice of neither child attending school. 
B. j = 1 reflects the household choice of both children attending school. 
C. j = 2 reflects the household choice of only the younger eligible child attending school 
D. j = 3 reflects the household choice of only the older eligible child attending school4 
Because these outcomes are discrete, independent, and unordered, the multinomial logit is 
appropriate for fitting a model to the data, which uses maximum likelihood estimation 
(StataCorp 2009). This model estimates a set of coefficients that provides the probability of 
household i choosing occupational choice j when sending neither child to school is the base 
outcome according to the following set of generalized equations:  
Pr (j = 0) = 
 
                          
 
 
Pr (j = 1) = 
      
                          
 
 
Pr (j = 2) = 
      
                          
 
 
Pr (j = 3) = 
      
                          
 
 
                                                          
4
 This paper might provide a more thorough analysis of the impacts of the conditional cash transfer program on child 
time allocation by including options that denote whether non-school time is spent working at home, working in the 
labor market, or not working. However, in this instance, the data would not provide enough observations for each 
occupational choice to allow for a robust estimation of the multinomial logit regression. Furthermore, the dataset 
used does not provide detailed information about domestic work and child activities.  
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The multinomial logit can be interpreted with a utility-maximizing component, where household 
i chooses the occupational choice j that maximizes its utility, where the utility of each 
occupational choice is identified as follows:  
1a. Ui(0) = ρ0*Wi +γ0*Zi + δ0*Xi + α0*(Y-i + yi0) + vi0 
1b. Ui(1) = ρ1*Wi + γ1*Zi + δ1*Xi + α1*(Y-i + yi1) + vi1 
1c. Ui(2) = ρ2*Wi +γ2*Zi + δ2*Xi + α2*(Y-i + yi2) + vi2 
1d. Ui(3) = ρ3*Wi +γ3*Zi + δ3*Xi + α3*(Y-i + yi3) + vi3 
In the above equation set, Wi is the marginality index used for program targeting, Zi is a vector 
of household characteristics including household size, age of the household head, education of 
the household head, a dummy equal to one if the household head works in agriculture or 
livestock, number of children aged five or younger, number of children between ages 14 and 18; 
Xi is a vector of characteristics of the eligible children in the household including age of the 
younger eligible child, age of the older eligible child, sex of the younger eligible child, and sex 
of the older eligible child; Y-i is the total household income net of the predicted income 
contributions of eligible children; yij is the predicted income contributions of eligible children in 
each occupational state, and vij is the error term. 
 In order to appropriately model the household response to the presence of a CCT 
program, the model must be able to account for the gains in utility from the cash transfer and 
account for the labor response of children when one or both children attend school. Presumably, 
a child who attends school will have less time for working. Therefore, the child income 
contributions will be lower when one or multiple children attend school. Here, the paper uses its 
first set of structural assumptions by identifying the labor response of children in each 
occupational state: 
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2a. yi0 = wia + wib  
2b. yi1 = MB*yi0: MB = M 
2c. yi2 = MY*yi0 
2d. yi3 = MO*yi0 
where MB, MY, and MO are equal to some proportions between 0 and 1 that indicate that a 
household receives less income from children when one of both of them are enrolled or attend 
school. The variables wia and wib are the predicted earnings of the older child and the younger 
child, respectively. The specific proportion of M is identified from earnings equation 7 and is 
discussed later in this chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that households forego (1 – 
MB)*yi0 in child contributions to income when both children attend school. Similarly, households 
forego (1 – MY)*yi0 and (1 – MO)*yi0 in child contributions to income when the younger and the 
older children attend school, respectively. I use an OLS wage regression to identify MB, which 
allows for the eventual identification of every other necessary parameter. MY and MO, therefore, 
can be understood as the proportions by which I multiply total child income contributions when 
only the younger child or only the older child attends or is enrolled in school, respectively. MY 
and MO account not only for the lower earnings potential of children attending school but they 
also account for how the unschooled child’s workload shifts in the household. For example, if 
the older child attends school, the younger child may bear a greater workload in order to 
compensate for the older child’s absence during school hours.  
In the presence of the conditional cash transfer program, a household chooses from the 
same option set as in equation set 1, but all eligible households receive the bono alimentario 
without a behavioral response and receive the school attendance transfer only when sending both 
children to school (j = 1). As noted in Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005), a simple addition of 
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income to an estimated multinomial logit would inaccurately reflect the program’s guidelines, as 
households only receive the educational transfer when choosing occupational outcome 1 
(sending both children to school). Therefore, the set of utility choices for eligible households in 
the presence of a conditional cash transfer program are as follows: 
3a. Ui(0) = ρ0*Wi +γ0*Zi + δ0*Xi + α0*(Y-i + yi0 + η) + vi0 
3b. Ui(1) = ρ1*Wi + γ1*Zi + δ1*Xi + α1*(Y-i + yi1 + η + θ + 2ρ) + vi1 
3c. Ui(2) = ρ2*Wi +γ2*Zi + δ2*Xi + α2*(Y-i + yi2 + η) + vi2 
3d. Ui(3) = ρ3*Wi +γ3*Zi + δ3*Xi + α3*(Y-i + yi3 + η) + vi3 
for households that meet RPS eligibility requirements and 
 
4a. Ui(0) = ρ0*Wi +γ0*Zi + δ0*Xi + α0*(Y-i + yi0) + vi0 
4b. Ui(1) = ρ1*Wi + γ1*Zi + δ1*Xi + α1*(Y-i + yi1) + vi1 
4c. Ui(2) = ρ2*Wi +γ2*Zi + δ2*Xi + α2*(Y-i + yi2) + vi2 
4d. Ui(3) = ρ3*Wi +γ3*Zi + δ3*Xi + α3*(Y-i + yi3) + vi3 
for households that do not meet RPS eligibility requirements.
5
 
 
Here, η represents the bono alimentario and is assumed to be given to households in 
every occupational state. This assumption is reasonable, as Maluccio and Flores (2005) find that 
95.8 percent of beneficiary households had taken their newborn children to a health control 
center in the past six months, which met one of the health benefit conditions of the program.
 6
  
While receiving this transfer also required beneficiaries to bring children aged 3 to 5 to health 
care appointments, the data do not provide information on whether households did in fact fulfill 
this requirement. Adequate weight gain was initially a requirement for receipt of this transfer, but 
                                                          
5
 In the sample considered for this analysis, no households were excluded from the program benefits on the basis of 
wealth indicators. Therefore, the simulation performs the treatment on all households.  
6
 This 95.8% rate of participation is not affected by adult literacy, household income, or marital status (Gitter and 
Barham 2008). 
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this requirement was not monitored after it was found that it excluded the poorest households 
from receiving the program benefits (Maluccio and Flores 2005). This transfer likely had an 
income effect on schooling, and assuming that households receive this benefit may bias the 
simulated results upward. However, deciding which households should be modeled as having 
received this component of the transfer is not straightforward and is likely more problematic than 
is the assumption that all households had received this transfer. The variable θ is the bono 
escolar, or the per-household component of the education transfer. The variable ρ represents the 
mochila escolar, or the school supplies transfer. The variable ρ is the per-child component of the 
education transfer and is only delivered if the household sends both children to school.  
To incorporate the child labor response identified in equation set 2 into the utility realized 
in each occupational state, I combine equation sets 2 and 3, which yields: 
5a. Ui(0) = ρ0*Wi +γ0*Zi + δ0*Xi + α0*Y-i + β0*(wia + wib) + vi0 
5b. Ui(1) = ρ1*Wi + γ1*Zi + δ1*Xi + α1*Y-i + β1*(wia + wib) + vi1 
5c. Ui(2) = ρ2*Wi +γ2*Zi + δ2*Xi + α2*Y-i + β2*(wia + wib) + vi2 
5d. Ui(3) = ρ3*Wi +γ3*Zi + δ3*Xi + α3*Y-i + β3*(wia + wib) + vi3 
where β1 = α1*MB, β0 = α0, β2 = α2*MY, β1 = α1*MO. 
For notational simplicity, let wia + wib = wi, which represents the sum of predicted earnings of 
eligible children. Changes in child earnings in different occupational states are captured by 
changes in the coefficients on child income contributions. Here, the paper applies assumption I: 
non-school time spent in the labor market and non-school time spent working at home is of equal 
value to the household. This assumption allows the model to specify only whether a child spends 
her time in school or not. Therefore, how non-school time is specifically spent is ignored. It 
follows from the assumption of non-selection that applying the same proportion M to child 
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earnings adequately models the potential earnings of children who attend school, regardless of 
how non-school time is spent. 
One challenge of using the multinomial logit for estimation is that the multinomial logit 
does not directly estimate the utility coefficients from the above utility equation but instead 
estimates differences in utilities. For example, the multinomial logit yields the following 
differences in utility estimates:  
6a. Ui(1) - Ui(0) =  ̂1*Wi +   ̂1*Zi +  ̂1*Xi +  ̂1*(Y-i + η)  + α1*(θ+ 2ρ) +  ̂1*wi +  ̂i1 
6b. Ui(2) - Ui(0) =  ̂2*Wi +   ̂2*Zi +  ̂2*Xi +   ̂2*(Y-i + η) +  ̂2*wi +  ̂i2 
6c. Ui(3) - Ui(0) =  ̂3*Wi +   ̂3*Zi +  ̂3*Xi +   ̂3*(Y-i + η) +  ̂3*wi +  ̂i3 
for beneficiary households. In the equations described in set 6, the estimated coefficients 
represent the difference between the coefficient in the corresponding utility function described in 
equation set 5 and the coefficient from the utility function of the base outcome (j = 0, sending 
neither eligible child to school) in the same equation set. For example,  ̂1 = γ1 - γ0, where  ̂1 is 
estimated by the regression and γ1 and γ0 are not. As shown, α1 in equation 6a is the only 
coefficient that cannot be directly estimated from the multinomial logit regression. The identities  
β1 = α1*MB, β0 = α0, β2 = α2*MY, and β3 = α3*MO  
from the child labor response and the identities  
 ̂1 = α1 – α0 and  ̂1 = β1 – β0  
from the specification of the multinomial logit allow for a structural estimation of this parameter. 
Specifically,  
α1 = ( ̂1 -  ̂1)/(MB - 1). 
α0
 = α1 -  ̂1 
α2 =  ̂2
 + α0 
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α3 =  ̂3
 + α0 
Using this structural identification, I can simulate the choice of household i in the presence of the 
RPS program by simply estimating the original multinomial logit regression described in 
equation set 1 and applying the structural assumptions from equation set 2. 
 What remains in the estimation is obtaining an approximation of the residuals for each 
occupational choice for each household. These residuals represent the component of household 
decision-making behavior driven by unobserved preferences. The utility-maximization 
component of the multinomial logit requires that if a household is observed to have chosen 
outcome j, then it must be the case that the household prefers outcome j to all other alternatives. 
Formally, this idea is represented as 
Sil = j iff Sij(Wi, Zi, Xi; Y-i + yij) + vij > Sik(Wi, Zi, Xi; Y-i + yik) + vik for all k.  
 
The multinomial logit provides estimates for the coefficients of differences between the relevant 
outcome and the base outcome. The estimate of the multinomial logistic regression then provides 
that a household chooses outcome j (j, k   0) if  
Ui(j) - Ui(0) =  ̂j*Wi +  ̂j*Zi +  ̂j*Xi +  ̂j*Y-i  +  ̂j*wi +  ̂ij > 0 
and  
Ui(j) - Ui(0) =  ̂j*Wi +  ̂j*Zi +  ̂j*Xi +  ̂j*Y-i  +  ̂j*yij +  ̂ij > Ui(k) - Ui(0) =  ̂k*Wi +  ̂k*Zi + 
 ̂k*Xi +  ̂k*Y-i  +  ̂k*wi +  ̂ik for all k. 
Similarly, the multinomial logistic regression provides that a household chooses outcome j = 0 
where k   0 if  
Ui(k) - Ui(0) =  ̂k*Wi +  ̂k*Zi +  ̂k*Xi +  ̂k*Y-i  +  ̂k*wi +  ̂ik < 0 for all k. 
Discrete choice models such as those estimated with the multinomial logit cannot provide 
estimates of  ̂ij = vij – vi0, but the utility-maximizing theory of the multinomial logit suggests 
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certain intervals for these quantities, as presented in Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003). 
Specifically, the residuals must satisfy the inequalities presented above. While households might 
theoretically order their preferences for unobserved alternatives k, the model cannot capture 
household preferences except for the household’s observed choice j. Therefore, I choose from a 
distribution of residuals that satisfy the above inequalities for each household. These values,  ̂ij 
and  ̂ik, represent a particular household’s preference for an occupational choice that is not 
captured by the coefficients estimated in the multinomial logistic regression.  
 Freije, Bando, and Arce (2006) use similar methods to evaluate Mexico’s Oportunidades. 
They present a method of picking residuals in a pseudo-random manner that satisfy the 
inequalities implicit in the utility-maximizing theory of the multinomial logit. They suggest that, 
in addition to those conditions mentioned above, residuals must also meet the following 
condition: 
 ̂ij = -ln[-ln(ui,j)], u ~ U(0,1). 
This condition follows from the assumption that residuals are distributed with an extreme-value 
distribution in the multinomial logit model. This final condition, then, formally expresses that 
residuals are randomly drawn from an extreme-value distribution such that each particular draw 
falls within the upper and lower bounds of the interval suggested by a household’s observed 
choice. After these residuals are drawn, the model perfectly matches the household’s revealed 
preferences in the absence of the simulation of the RPS program.  
 
3.3 DATA 
The primary source of data was provided by the International Food Policy and Research Institute 
which provided information from households in both the treatment and control localities of the 
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program. The survey sample was randomized at the comarca level from the 42 comarcas in the 
rural central region in Nicaragua in which the experiment takes place. The data includes 
information from a non-representative sample of 42 household surveys in each comarca, 
conducted at the baseline (in September 2000) and after the first year of the implementation of 
the program (beginning in October 2001). The surveys used were based on survey instruments 
from the 1998 Nicaraguan Living Standards and Measurement Survey from the World Bank. 
They collected information regarding child health and education, economic activities, 
anthropometric information for children under the age of five, characteristics of house and 
household, expenditures information, women’s fertility, and community characteristics. 
Additionally, the dataset provided census information on a limited number of household 
characteristics from all households in the 42 comarcas in which the program was implemented. 
The census provided a registry of all households in the area as well as information about the 
level of education completed, number of people living in the household, and the age of each 
individual in the household.  
 The IFPRI data were collected as a part of an experiment to evaluate the impact of the 
Nicaraguan CCT, Red de Protección Social. This analysis runs a simulation using data from the 
surveys collected from households in the control communities and validates this approach using 
data collected from households in treated communities after the program was implemented. 
Therefore, comparing the means of observable characteristics at the baseline is an important 
component of evaluating whether the comparison of means after the treatment is reasonable. The 
results of t-test comparisons in 2000 as presented in Table 2 reveal that treated and untreated 
households were largely similar at the baseline.  
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 Household size is significantly different between treatment and control households, but the 
difference is small. Of greater concern is the difference between the means of the attendance 
rates between treatment and control communities in 2000. I define school attendance as missing 
3 or fewer days in the previous month, unless the primary reason for missing school is reported 
as sickness. The difference in the means of attendance rates between treatment and control 
communities is large (10.5%) and highly significant. Because this variable represents the 
dependent variable in the multinomial logistic regression, large differences prior to treatment is 
nontrivial and will generate a downward bias in the simulated results presented. One method of 
mitigating this problem would be to use enrollment as an indicator for schooling instead of 
attendance because rates of enrollment are not statistically different at the baseline. However, 
school attendance provides a better proxy for child’s educational activities. The enrollment 
decision takes place at the beginning of the year and may not be an accurate representation of 
whether children are spending time in school. In fact, 13.39% of children from the sample who 
reported in 2000 that they were enrolled did not attend school regularly in the month prior to the 
survey. Therefore, using enrollment is only a weak indication of schooling activities that might 
detract from a child’s labor activities. Because of these drawbacks, this paper will present and 
compare results from simulation models using enrollment and attendance. Furthermore, the 
results from these t-tests at the baseline suggest that t-test estimates of actual program impacts on 
enrollment (comparing the mean of enrollment rates in treatment communities to the mean of 
enrollment rates in control communities) are an appropriate comparison for simulated program 
impacts. However, because attendance rates are statistically different at the baseline, t-test 
estimates of the actual program impacts on attendance may not be an appropriate comparison for 
simulated program impacts on attendance.  
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Comparing the imputed predicted earnings reported in table 3 using enrollment and using 
attendance reveals a potential shortcoming in this analysis’s methods. The difference between 
predicted earnings using enrollment and predicted earnings using school attendance is larger than 
what can be explained with differences in the estimated coefficients and can be attributed to the 
large element of randomness in the error term and small sample size. Therefore, the results 
presented here are likely to be sensitive to changes in the draws from the vector of error terms in 
the earnings regression and draws from the vector of error terms in the multinomial logit. 
Multiple iterations of the simulation would reveal how well the simulation performs given 
alternative draws from the residual vector. The method used to impute earnings data is discussed 
below. Here it is sufficient to note that the difference between the two means of predicted 
earnings is substantial.  
The IFPRI dataset used to evaluate RPS includes information on economic activities of 
children, but it provides no information on wages from these economic activities. Therefore, I 
use income information from the 2001 Living Standards and Measurement Survey for Nicaragua 
which is a nationally representative sample of households in the country. This dataset includes 
geographic information, characteristics of house and household, child age and characteristics, 
types of economic activity and the income procured from these activities. For wage estimation, 
only children from the northern regions of Nicaragua reporting wages between the ages of 7 and 
18 are used.  
The descriptive statistics of the sample used to estimate earnings reported in table 4 
indicate that children reporting wages are most likely male and attend school at lower rates than 
in the dataset used to estimate the household schooling decision. These descriptive statistics 
provide some evidence of potential bias that enters into the analysis by neglecting selection into 
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the labor market. Both the higher percentage of males and the lower percentage of children 
attending school in the dataset used for wages are likely to inflate the earnings estimates used in 
this analysis.  
 
3.4 ESTIMATING CHILD EARNINGS  
 
One of the key components for this simulation of participation in the conditional cash transfer 
program is the identification of the opportunity cost of a child’s time for a household. Children 
contribute to the household through market work or unpaid time contributions from work in the 
household. Nearly half (46%) of children aged 7 to 14 were engaged in domestic work for 14 
hours or more every week in Nicaragua. 15% of children aged 7 to 14 worked in the market 
(Dammert 2010, Edmonds 2007). Market activities include farm work, working with livestock, 
milling, or helping with a family business. Domestic work includes cleaning, shopping, cooking, 
fetching water and wood, and caring for younger siblings (Dammert 2010, Edmonds 2007). The 
type of work and the time spent working varies across genders and is affected by age and the 
ability of the child (del Carpio and Macours 2009). While work and school are not mutually 
exclusive activities in Nicaragua, certain market activities are more likely to crowd out schooling 
than domestic work.  The types of economic activities of children generally vary by gender. 
Boys tend to specialize in agricultural and market work that is more likely to crowd out 
schooling. Girls, on the other hand, tend to specialize in domestic production which is often 
complementary to schooling (del Carpio and Macours 2009).  
For this analysis, I will use monthly child earnings estimates from an ordinary least 
squares regression using a nationally representative dataset as a proxy for the opportunity cost of 
children’s time and rely on the experimental results of the randomized trial in order to establish 
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the robustness of these results. Estimating child earnings gives an approximation of the potential 
labor market earnings for a child had she not attended school and is important in the schooling 
decision (Azevedo, Bouillon, and Yáñez-Pagans 2009).  
That children’s schooling is correlated with their potential earnings is established in the 
literature. Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003) find that Brazilian children are more likely to 
leave school when the wages of low-skilled workers increase. Ferreira and Schady (2009) find 
that the relationship between macroeconomic shocks and educational outcomes is region-
specific: enrollment tends to decline in periods of economic expansion in Latin America while 
the converse tends to be true in Africa. In Nicaragua, Vakis, Kruger, and Mason (2004) find that 
poor households use child labor as a coping mechanism to income shocks which reduces school 
enrollment. Dammert (2008) finds that child labor was sensitive to policies affecting coca 
production while child schooling was unaffected in Peru.  
This model relies heavily on child earnings as an opportunity cost of the child’s time, but 
the estimation of earnings is particularly problematic. In most cases, the major identification 
issue of child wages stems from the fact that skills are correlated with both wages and the 
schooling status of the child, violating the assumption of the exogeneity of regressors for 
ordinary least squares. For this model, I must estimate the opportunity cost of the time of each 
eligible child, but I only observe market wages for children in the labor market. In order to 
circumvent this selection problem, many economists use instrumental variables (Attanasio, 
Meghir, and Santiago 2005, Todd and Wolpin 2006). However, the limited dataset from the 
experimental data used to evaluate RPS does not include a convincing instrument which 
eliminates the possibility for an IV approach to wage estimation. Thomas (2010) uses distance to 
school as an alternative proxy for the opportunity cost of a child’s time in the absence of wage 
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data in Nicaragua. Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003) use the changes of the wages of low-
skilled men between the ages of 30 and 35 in a particular region as a proxy for changes in child 
wages in that region to measure the effects of changes in the opportunity cost of a child’s time on 
changes in school enrollment and child working status.  
The dataset from IFPRI that is used to evaluate the Red de Protección Social is limited as 
survey designers truncated a model of LSMS surveys in order to reduce respondent burdens 
(IFPRI 2005). As a result, key variables for this simulation are missing from the dataset. Among 
other items, it does not include child earnings data. The dataset does, however, provide detailed 
information on the type of economic activity for individuals in the household, geographic 
location of the household, working hours of all household members, and child characteristics. I 
use the 2001 household survey from the Living Standards and Measurement Survey and impute 
earnings data into the RPS dataset using the results from an OLS regression which matches on 
the type of economic activity and a vector of child characteristics.  
Finding empirical evidence for the opportunity cost of time for such young children is 
another issue, even when using a nationally representative, rich dataset. While child labor is 
prevalent in Nicaragua, few children actually participate in a labor market where wages are 
formal (Edmonds 2007). To limit the scope of child labor to those activities which draw a 
reported wage is certainly to misunderstand child work and the household schooling decision. 
Children aged 7 to 13 are eligible for the Nicaraguan conditional cash transfer program, but the 
LSMS dataset does not provide ample observations in this age group to allow for reliable 
regression analysis. Therefore, I expand the age of children in the regression analysis to ages 7 to 
18 to identify the functional form of the relationship between age and monthly child earnings. I 
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then use this functional form to approximate earnings for younger children, for whom the data 
provide only a few observations.  
Additionally, the dataset only provides a few observations at specific department and 
municipality levels. Because child labor markets are highly localized, matching observations by 
geographic region is of particular importance. Wages are likely to vary by region according to 
the local demand for child labor. While identifying wage levels at specific department and 
municipality levels would allow for more precise estimations of child wages, the dearth of 
observations in each of these geographic regions makes this approach infeasible. Therefore, I 
limit the sample in the wage estimations to those in the north central departments of the country, 
where the RPS program was implemented.  
I follow the approach of Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) and use standard OLS 
to estimate monthly child earnings. For this model, I use a log-polynomial model to regress the 
log of monthly earnings on a vector of child characteristics from a standard Mincerian wage 
equation. The data and the literature both suggest that the functional form of the relationship 
between age and earnings vary across genders and is quadratic (See Figure 1). The regression 
equation is as follows:  
7. Ln( ̅i) = Intercept + η1*Xi + η2*Agei + η3*Agei
2
 + η4*Malei*Agei + η5*Malei*Agei
2
 +  
 
       m*School dummyi + εi 
 
where  ̅i represents child monthly earnings, Xi is the vector of child characteristics affecting 
earnings such as whether the child works in agriculture, whether the child lives in a rural area, 
and the level of education that the child has completed. Malei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the child is a male, School dummyi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a child attends school, and 
εi is the error term that includes unobserved characteristics that affect a child’s earnings. The 
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coefficient on the school attendance dummy plays a critical role in identifying the child labor 
response in the presence of a conditional cash transfer program. The specific proportion of MB is 
multiplied by the full earnings of children who do not attend school to account for the earnings 
lost by attending school. This model uses MB = exp(m).  
Tables 5 and 6 report the results from the OLS regression that estimates the log of child 
earnings. Robust standard errors are reported. On the whole, these results have the expected 
signs and are significant. I expected that age would have a concave relationship with the log of 
earnings, but this relationship did not hold. Instead, the data suggests that age has a convex 
relationship with the log of earnings for both boys and girls aged 7 to 18. This finding could be 
attributed to the limited number of observations for the youngest children in the sample and the 
greater and more diverse number of observations for the oldest children in the sample. 
Furthermore, intuition suggests that older children with greater strength and skill are more likely 
to draw higher earnings. However, the youngest children in the sample are likely only to enter 
the formal wage labor market if the wage offer is very high, the result of selection bias in the 
data. Level of education is positive and significant, as expected. The dummy variable for school 
enrollment/attendance takes on a negative sign and can be interpreted as a reduction in earnings 
for children who are enrolled in or attend school and thereby spend less time in the labor market. 
This variable is included in order to identify the potential earnings of the children in each of the 
four occupational choices. It is important to note that schooling and work inside or outside of the 
home are not mutually exclusive. In Nicaragua, short school days allow children to combine both 
work and schooling (Duryea and Arends-Kuenning 2003). The sign and significance of this 
dummy variable in the regression suggests that children that combine work and schooling face 
lower earnings than children who only work in the labor market. Agricultural work is associated 
 45 
with lower earnings. In order to impute the child earnings into the RPS dataset for all children, I 
multiply these coefficient estimates by the appropriate observed variable for each observation 
and draw random samples with replacement from the residuals in the relevant age range for the 
imputed error term.  
 Little of child earnings is explained by this regression, as suggested by the low R
2
. The 
limited dataset used does not allow this regression to control for the local demand for child labor, 
likely contributing to this low R
2
. A poorly fitting regression line is nontrivial in this study, and it 
should be noted that a large portion of the child monthly earnings used in this study is random. 
Limiting the sample to observations within the RPS-eligible age range with wage information 
requires a substantial drop-off in sample size. The time use data of children suggest that young 
children are indeed contributing to household income, but few are contributing by means of labor 
in a formal wage market. To the extent that the observed wage data does not reflect the 
opportunity cost of a child’s time – because non-wage work is valued very differently than wage 
work for instance – this specification of the opportunity cost of children’s time introduces bias 
into the sample.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RPS SIMULATION RESULTS AND MODEL VALIDATION 
 
4.1 RESULTS FROM MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION USING ATTENDANCE 
AS AN INDICATOR FOR SCHOOLING  
Having an estimate for the potential child contributions to household income in each 
occupational state, I am now ready to estimate the occupational choice decision for households 
with two eligible children using the multinomial logit. Table 7 provides the results of the 
estimation when attendance is used as an indicator of schooling. 
The multinomial logit regression shows that there are certain patterns of household 
characteristics that act as high-risk factors for being kept from schooling. The results from this 
regression report the change in the probability of choosing a particular outcome relative to the 
base outcome of sending neither child to school. Unsurprisingly, lower household income net of 
the contribution of eligible children is associated with a higher probability of neither eligible 
children attending school relative to both attending school. The potential earnings of children 
might correspond with the theory of opportunity cost, but this regression does not provide 
substantial evidence to support that claim. One would expect that if high earnings potential keeps 
children out of school, the estimated coefficients on these variables would be negative and 
significant. This sign only holds and is significant for the outcome of sending only the younger 
child to school relative to sending neither child to school. The insignificance of the coefficient 
estimates in this regression might be an indication that the earnings regression used to estimate 
child income contributions serves as a poor proxy to actual child income contributions. A more 
obvious indicator of child schooling is the education of the household head, and households with 
less educated household heads are at the highest risk for being out of school. Variables that serve 
as a proxy for the demand for labor in the household are also indicative of characteristics that put 
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children at high risk for low schooling. Having multiple children aged five or younger reduces 
the probability that the younger eligible child will attend school. Children aged five or younger 
are likely to keep the younger eligible child from school, presumably to help with caretaking. 
Another indicator for the household demand for child labor is whether a household is involved in 
agriculture. This result might be driven by the tendency of farming households to keep children 
out of school in order to help with agricultural work. Conversely, this variable may simply serve 
as a reflection that households engaged in agriculture lack adequate access to schools or face 
disproportionately high transportation costs to the local school. An additional variable that is 
likely correlated with the schooling decision of the household is the sex of the household head. 
However, this variable exhibits no variation for households choosing to send only the youngest 
child to school, making the determination of the intercept term impossible. Therefore, this 
variable is excluded from the regression. 
 The sibling interaction variables are important in determining how the time of eligible 
children is allocated. In general, the findings presented confirm those presented in the literature: 
boys are most vulnerable to low schooling in rural Nicaragua. However, the results presented 
here suggest that the gender of a particular child, the age rank of a particular child relative to the 
other eligible sibling, and the gender of the other eligible sibling all play an important role in 
determining child schooling. As echoed in del Carpio and Macours (2009) and Dammert (2009), 
sibling composition and sibling activities do affect the schooling of children in a household. An 
important note throughout the discussion of these results is that these findings provide no 
information about the non-school activities of children in the presence of the program. Certainly, 
one might reason that increased schooling will crowd out working time for some children, but 
increased schooling for other children might come at the cost of leisure rather than economic 
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activities. The survey used questions that focused on work outside of the home, and reducing 
child labor to wage labor is simply a mischaracterization of the realities of child contributions to 
the household. Therefore, this study does not attempt to make a thorough policy analysis 
regarding the impacts of CCTs on children’s economic activities. This data also cannot support 
whether specialization exists for children in the household, as only the schooling of each eligible 
child is evaluated. However, some clear patterns exist that might be explained using the literature 
on child time allocation in the household. The most obvious figure in the data is the low 
probability of attendance for a younger sister with an older brother in the average household. The 
literature suggests that girls in Nicaragua generally contribute to household income through 
domestic work which is complementary to schooling. On the other hand, boys generally 
contribute to household income through agricultural or market labor which acts as a substitute 
for schooling. In this case, a younger sister is less likely to attend school if she has an older 
brother than if she has an older sister. It might, therefore, be the case that a young girl shares the 
domestic workload with an older sister, allowing for household contributions that do not crowd 
out schooling. However, an older brother contributes outside of the household, which does not 
reduce the need for labor in the home, which crowds out schooling for both of the eligible 
children. Late starting is also a pronounced problem in Nicaragua, explaining the lower 
probability of attending school for younger siblings than for older siblings. While the precise 
tendencies of child time allocation and specializations for multiple children cannot be explained 
in this analysis, the data do suggest that sibling interactions, age rank, and gender are all 
important determinants of schooling.  
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4.1.1 RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION USING ATTENDANCE AS AN INDICATOR 
OF SCHOOLING 
The coefficient estimates from this multinomial logistic regression are then used in conjunction 
with the behavioral assumptions presented earlier to simulate the RPS program on the control 
communities in the sample. The coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit serve as 
coefficients for the household utility functions for each occupational state. The utility-
maximizing household then chooses the occupational state that yields the highest utility. 
Simulated attendance rates are subsequently calculated from these simulated household choices. 
The anticipated impacts of the program are presented in Table 8. This paper uses t-test estimates 
of the simulated program’s impact, comparing the simulated mean of school attendance rates in 
the presence of the simulated program to the observed mean of school attendance rates in the 
absence of any program.  
The simulation forecasts that the program would be most effective in drawing the 
youngest children in the range of eligibility of age to school, successfully reducing late starting. 
The program also has a greater simulated impact on males than females, which could be due to 
the lower baseline attendance rates for males. The attendance rates of younger siblings are 
increased more dramatically by the CCT than are the attendance rates of older siblings. 
Furthermore, the program has greater impacts for the poorest households in the sample, a result 
that is likely driven at least in part to the lower baseline attendance rates for this subgroup. The 
simulation suggests that the program has no significant impact on nonpoor households, which 
had high rates of schooling at the baseline (87.5%) and for whom the sample provides very few 
observations.  
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How households are expected to respond to the program is presented in Table 9. In the 
presence of the program, households are predicted to either maintain their baseline occupational 
status or are induced to move both children into school by the RPS program. This finding was 
anticipated as benefits were only transferred to households that moved into the occupational state 
which involved both children attending school. The magnitude of the impact is substantial; over 
87% of households sent both of their children to school when less than 64% chose this 
occupational status in the baseline.  
 
4.2 RESULTS FROM MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION USING ENROLLMENT 
AS AN INDICATOR OF SCHOOLING  
The second simulation exercise uses enrollment as an indicator for schooling. The results are 
generally equivalent to those found using attendance and are given in Table 10. Using enrollment 
as an indicator of schooling yields results very similar to those presented in the multinomial 
logistic regression using attendance. One problematic difference is the positive and significant 
coefficient on predicted child contributions to income. This result, considered in conjunction 
with the result from the previous model, might suggest that the randomness of earnings and the 
poor fit of the earnings regression are affecting the results. The model, therefore, is sensitive to 
alternative draws from residual vectors. Another difference is the magnitude and significance of 
the eligible children’s age variables. Furthermore, the difference in ages of eligible children has a 
positive and significant impact on the enrollment of children relative to both working. Children 
born further apart are more likely to be enrolled in school, relative to working. The positive and 
significant sign on the community marginality index suggests that children from poorer 
communities are more likely to be enrolled in school. This index is used to capture the 
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prevalence of poverty in each community and was used in the targeting phase of the 
implementation of RPS. This poverty index captures community conditions associated with 
poverty and may not reflect the community conditions associated with low rates of schooling.  
An important note with the two regressions and the simulated results derived from them 
is that the two models rest on different identifications of child income in each household 
occupational state. The loss of potential earnings in each occupational state is derived from 
different proportions MB, MY, and MO. The MB variable matches very closely across the two 
models, while the MY and MO parameters vary somewhat. Furthermore, it might hold that one 
model of the schooling decision is the result of a different household decision-making process 
that more accurately reflects the effects of the introduction of the conditional cash transfer 
program. Intuition suggests that attendance, not enrollment, would be a better reflection of child 
activities that would crowd out child labor and be more affected by earnings potential.  
 
4.2.1 RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION USING ENROLLMENT AS AN INDICATOR 
OF SCHOOLING  
Using the same strategies to construct a set of utility functions for each occupational choice 
using enrollment as an indicator of schooling, enrollment rates are derived from the simulated 
household behavioral response.  
The results of the simulation as reported in Table 11 suggest similar patterns in program 
impacts as for attendance: younger children experience higher impacts relative to older children; 
males are more affected by the program than females; and the poor benefit from higher 
forecasted impacts than the nonpoor, who do not experience a statistically significant impact. 
However, the magnitude of the impact is smaller for every group, likely due to the higher 
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enrollment rates at the baseline for control communities relative to attendance rates. The 
behavioral response of the households follows similar patterns using enrollment as when using 
attendance, as reported in Table 12.  
 
4.3 VALIDATING THE MODEL  
 
4.3.1 MODEL FIT AND THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
 
The following section is devoted to assessing how reasonable this forecast is. The first strategy 
for checking the validity of the model is by gauging the reasonableness of the parameters used in 
the utility functions that govern the household behavioral response, as suggested by 
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003). One would expect that the index of the α and β 
parameters would be positive in sign, as these represent the gains in utility from every unit 
change in direct income transfer and from child wages, respectively. As presented in table 13, the 
signs on these parameters hold in both models. Comparing across models indicates that the 
utility parameters are similar in magnitude for both schooling indicators. Another check of the 
relevance of the model is the comparison of the proportions by which income coefficients are 
multiplied. One expects that the proportion of potential earnings kept while simultaneously 
attending school would be less than one, as a child in school spends less time working. 
Therefore, it is expected that 0 < MB < MO < MY < 1 as a household foregoes the most child 
earnings when both children are in school (represented by MB). Similarly, a household would be 
expected to forego more earnings sending only the older child to school (MO) relative to sending 
only the younger child to school (MY), as earnings are typically increasing in age. This 
relationship implies that MO < MY. Table 14 presents the parameters constructed in this analysis. 
The parameter MY does not follow theoretical expectations in either model. In fact, MY suggests 
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that a household loses more child income by sending only the younger child to school than by 
sending both children to school. This relationship is unlikely to reflect the reality of the 
household and more likely reveals a weakness in the methods used for the wage estimation for 
younger children. The magnitudes of MB and MO provide that schooling and working are not 
mutually exclusive activities. Additionally, comparing MO across schooling indicators suggests 
that households forego more in total child income contributions when the older child attends 
school rather than when he is enrolled in school.  
 
4.3.2 VALIDATION WITH EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
The last method of model validation requires comparing the results of the simulation to the 
observed impact of the program. Todd and Wolpin (2006) use out-of-sample validation 
techniques for their ex-ante analysis of a school subsidy program in Mexico. They provide an 
estimate of the experimental impact using cross-sections (t-test comparisons of means across 
treatment and control groups) and difference-in-differences. This paper will follow their 
validation techniques, utilizing the experimental data. Because the descriptive statistics for 
households with two eligible children are comparable and generally statistically insignificant in 
their differences, I use t-tests and compare the means of the rates of schooling across treated and 
control groups before and after the simulation. This method of testing is appropriate if there were 
no differential changes across treatment and control groups for the sample. I validate the model 
with t-tests by age, by gender, by poverty status, and by age rank to ensure that the simulated 
program is impacting children that are similar on observable characteristics in similar ways. 
Tables 15-20 and Figures 2 and 3 present various estimates of the impacts of the program on 
enrollment and attendance including 
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1. a t-test that compares the means of schooling indicators of the observed treatment group 
to the observed control group (a t-test estimate of the impact of the implemented RPS 
program) 
2. a t-test that compares the means of schooling indicators of the simulated treatment group 
to the observed control group (a t-test estimate of the impact of the simulated RPS 
program) 
3. the rate of schooling in the observed treatment group and the simulated rate of schooling 
in the observed control group post-simulated treatment.  
I also include the results of t-tests that compare the simulated mean of schooling in the control 
group post-simulation to the observed mean of schooling in the treatment group post-program. 
These results can be found in the appendix of this paper. In these figures, a model with high 
predictive power will provide a difference in impact estimates that is statistically insignificant.   
 Because attendance rates were significantly different between treatment and control 
groups at the baseline, an additional estimate of observed program impact on attendance rates is 
presented by the following difference-in-differences estimator: 
School attendanceit = ι + ϕ*(Treatedi*Year 2001i) + ω*(Treatedi) + χ*(Year 2001i) + εi 
 
where ϕ provides the estimated impact of the program on school attendance rates. The only 
necessary assumption for a difference-in-differences estimator to be unbiased is that of parallel 
trends between treatment and control groups, and there is no clear evidence that suggests that this 
assumption is violated with the experimental data. While the survey suffered from non-random 
attrition between treatment and control groups, Maluccio and Flores (2005) explain that the 
attrition is not a major concern. Difference-in-differences allows for the estimation of the 
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magnitude of program impact despite the significantly different attendance rates in 2000. The 
full results of this regression used can be found in the appendix.  
 The average treatment effect is useful in evaluating the performance of the simulation, 
but a more rigorous check of the model’s validity requires a comparison of average treatment 
effects by subgroups. These comparisons ensure that the simulated estimates of the program 
impact are the result of the participation of observably similar individuals. I divide the sample of 
households with two eligible children into groups by age, gender, age rank (younger or older 
sibling relative to the other eligible sibling), and poverty status. I follow the methods of 
Maluccio and Flores (2005) to present the simulated impact by poverty subgroup. Poverty status 
is determined by comparing the per capita incomes from 2000 to the 2001 poverty lines 
determined by the World Bank. As noted in Maluccio and Flores (2005), the consumer price 
inflation rate for 2000 was 4%, leading to only trivial differences in the findings presented. 
Extreme poverty is defined as having per capita annual expenditures less than C$2,691. Poverty 
is defined as having per capita annual expenditures less than C$5,157 (World Bank 2003). 
Therefore, this comparison is actually comparing the estimated impact of the program by groups 
of household poverty status in 2000. Comparing across poverty status in 2001 would be tricky as 
treated households, by the fact of their having been treated, would be more likely to have 
changed their poverty status. Comparing across subgroups necessarily reduces the sample size on 
which the analysis is conducted, reducing the power of these tests.  
Comparing the simulated results of the program to the observed experimental results 
suggests that the simulation is a reasonably strong predictor of program outcomes. The 
simulation fails to generate the same magnitude of impact as the difference-in-differences 
regression on school attendance estimates. This finding, however, is expected; the control group 
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on which the simulation was run had much higher baseline attendance rates. Therefore, I also 
present the simulated impact estimates using t-tests to the experimental impact estimates using t-
tests. Also reported are the post-program attendance and enrollment rates in both the control and 
treatment groups and the rates of household occupational choice. Simulated enrollment rates 
perform rather poorly for child in the upper end of the age distribution. Simulated attendance 
rates and simulated program impacts on attendance also perform poorly for children younger 
than age 10 and younger eligible children. This age group is most affected by the assumption of 
no selection into the labor market. These children are modeled as having unreasonably high 
predicted earnings. In the model using attendance as an indicator for schooling, high predicted 
earnings are likely to explain the large discrepancies between the experimental impacts and the 
simulated impacts for particular subgroups.  
Looking at the impact distribution reveals that analogous subgroups are affected by the 
program in similar ways. Children within the same age, gender, poverty status, and age rank 
groups tend to experience simulated magnitudes of impact in patterns similar to their treated 
peers.  The model using enrollment seems to perform better than the model using attendance. 
RPS and the simulation report greater impacts for boys than for girls. Additionally, younger 
eligible children are more likely to attend school as a result of the program than are older eligible 
children. Impacts are greater for poorer households. Children that fall in the middle of the 
eligible age range report little to no impact as a result of the RPS program.  
 Certainly, this model is limited in its ability to capture how a program affects households 
outside of the income and conditionality effects of the transfer. These confounding factors and 
the bias they might impose are discussed. If these factors drive a large portion of the behavioral 
response, and the actual implementation of the program might drive somewhat different results 
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than those presented by the model. The first confounding factor is the significant difference in 
attendance rates between households in treatment and control groups at the baseline in 2000. In 
fact, because the control group on which the simulation was run experienced significantly higher 
attendance rates in 2000, lower simulated impacts should be expected. Maluccio and Flores 
(2005) also find that control households in 2000 likely increased their attendance in anticipation 
of the program. Therefore, results should be biased downward because of the higher attendance 
rates in 2000 and the increased attendance rates as a result of this anticipation of the program. 
Post-simulation rates of schooling should be unaffected by the difference in the schooling rates at 
the baseline and provide evidence that the simulation is generating a comparable response as the 
actual program. RPS coupled educational investment incentives with health investment 
incentives for eligible children. While the model captures the pure income effect of these 
transfers, it cannot capture the non-income-related increase in schooling associated with 
increased health and food security for the child.
7
 If these effects drove a considerable portion of 
the impacts observed in the treatment group, the simulation is underestimating the impact of the 
program. Similarly, Maluccio, Murphy, and Regalia (2009) identify the importance of initial 
supply-side conditions and the RPS-induced improvements in school supply in the determinants 
of program impacts on grade progression
8
. If these supply-side improvements are important in 
generating the magnitude of the impact, the simulation is likely underestimating the effectiveness 
of the program. Furthermore, a necessary assumption in this paper is that every household 
participates in the health check-ups and receives the bono alimentario. Shedding this assumption 
                                                          
7
 Glewwe and Miguel (2008) suggest that health investments might increase schooling rates and child learning. 
Alderman et al (2001) find that preschool nutritional status plays an important role in the educational attainment of 
children, suggesting that these non-income health effects might be important in determining the level of impact that 
RPS generates. However, RPS was targeted only to children aged 7 to 13, whose education might be less sensitive to 
health status.  
8
 The paper assesses the impact of supply conditions on grade progression for those students who were already in 
school. How changes in supply conditions will affect school attendance or enrollment is not addressed. 
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requires neglecting the income effects that the health component of the program generates but 
also inflates the magnitude of the impact simulated here. The assumption of no selection into the 
labor market likely inflates the earnings estimates that play a critical role in the estimation of the 
behavioral model. Inflated earnings would reduce the estimated impact of the program. These 
factors certainly confound the analysis, but comparing the simulation to the experimental results 
suggests that the bulk of the impact can be attributed to the income- and conditionality-effects of 
the transfer.   
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CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATED RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM DESIGNS 
 
5.1 ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM DESIGNS 
After constructing a model that accurately predicts the impacts of the RPS program, I adjust the 
payment eligibility and conditionality to predict how alternative programs might affect the 
results of the program. In this paper, I present the impact of four alternative program designs:  
1. Transfers are delivered on a per-child basis. A household receives an equal payment 
for each eligible child that attends school rather than a flat payment if all eligible 
children attend. The level of payment for each child in this scheme is equal to half of 
the household transfer that RPS delivered and is similar in structure to Mexico’s 
Oportunidades and Honduras’s PRAF. This program is modeled for eligible 
households as presented below:  
a. Ui(1) - Ui(0) =  ̂1*Wi +   ̂1*Zi +  ̂1*Xi +  ̂1*(Y-i + η)  + α1*(θ + 2ρ) +  ̂1*wi +  ̂i1 
b. Ui(2) - Ui(0) =  ̂2*Wi +   ̂2*Zi +  ̂2*Xi +   ̂2*(Y-i + η) + α2*(
 
 
*θ + ρ) +  ̂2*wi +  ̂i2 
c. Ui(3) - Ui(0) =  ̂3*Wi +   ̂3*Zi +  ̂3*Xi +   ̂3*(Y-i + η) + α3*(
 
 
*θ + ρ) +  ̂3*wi +  ̂i3 
2. Transfers are delivered on a per-child basis with each additional child after the first 
child receiving less than the first child. In this scheme, a household receives ¾ of the 
level of the RPS transfer for sending one eligible child to school and an additional ¼ 
of the level of the RPS transfer for sending the second eligible child to school. This 
program is modeled for eligible households as presented below: 
a. Ui(1) - Ui(0) =  ̂1*Wi +   ̂1*Zi +  ̂1*Xi +  ̂1*(Y-i + η)  + α1*(θ + 2ρ) +  ̂1*wi +  ̂i1 
b. Ui(2) - Ui(0) =  ̂2*Wi +   ̂2*Zi +  ̂2*Xi +   ̂2*(Y-i + η) + α2*(
 
 
*θ + ρ) +  ̂2*wi +  ̂i2 
c. Ui(3) - Ui(0) =  ̂3*Wi +   ̂3*Zi +  ̂3*Xi +   ̂3*(Y-i + η) + α3*(
 
 
*θ + ρ) +  ̂3*wi +  ̂i3 
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3. Transfers are delivered to households unconditionally. The level of payment in this 
scheme is equal to the level of payment delivered in the RPS program. This program 
is modeled for eligible households as presented below: 
a. Ui(1) - Ui(0) =  ̂1*Wi +   ̂1*Zi +  ̂1*Xi +  ̂1*(Y-i + η + θ + 2ρ) +  ̂1*wi +  ̂i1 
b. Ui(2) - Ui(0) =  ̂2*Wi +   ̂2*Zi +  ̂2*Xi +   ̂2*(Y-i + η + θ + 2ρ) +  ̂2*wi +  ̂i2 
c. Ui(3) - Ui(0) =  ̂3*Wi +   ̂3*Zi +  ̂3*Xi +   ̂3*(Y-i + η + θ + 2ρ) +  ̂3*wi +  ̂i3 
4. Transfers are delivered on a per-household basis. The level of payment in this scheme 
is equal to twice the level of payment delivered in the RPS program and delivered 
only to households sending both of their eligible children to school. This program is 
modeled for eligible households as presented below: 
a. Ui(1) - Ui(0) =  ̂1*Wi +   ̂1*Zi +  ̂1*Xi +  ̂1*(Y-i + η)  + α1*(2θ + 4ρ) +  ̂1*wi +  ̂i1 
b. Ui(2) - Ui(0) =  ̂2*Wi +   ̂2*Zi +  ̂2*Xi +   ̂2*(Y-i + η) +  ̂2*wi +  ̂i2 
c. Ui(3) - Ui(0) =  ̂3*Wi +   ̂3*Zi +  ̂3*Xi +   ̂3*(Y-i + η) +  ̂3*wi +  ̂i3 
The impacts of these programs are presented using t-tests that compare the mean of attendance 
rates with the simulated RPS alternative to the mean of attendance rates of the control group 
without a simulation. T-tests comparing the mean of attendance rates with the simulated RPS 
alternative to the mean of attendance rates with the simulated RPS program to identify whether 
the programs have significantly different impacts for eligible children are included in the 
appendix. The effects of each program design on intra-household inequalities and across-
household inequalities are then discussed.  
Tables 21 through 28 show how households changed their occupational choice in the 
presence of each program alternative relative to their simulated occupational choice in the 
presence of RPS. 
 61 
5.1.1 PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 1: EQUAL PER-CHILD TRANSFERS 
 
Simulating this alternative suggests that a per-child transfer might induce some households to 
invest unequally in the education of eligible children. This payment scheme induces households 
that chose to send both children to school under the RPS simulation to instead send only one 
child to school and collect the smaller payment. This reduced-form analysis does not allow for a 
thorough examination of the mechanisms driving a particular response. The analysis only allows 
for an estimation of the anticipated magnitude of the impact of alternative programs.  It is worth 
noting that the attendance and enrollment models suggest that households will respond 
differently to changes in the program conditions. The model using attendance suggests that while 
RPS induced many households to send both children to school, a per-child transfer allows a 
small group of households to reinforce intra-household inequalities in educational investments. 
In other words, households that participated in the original RPS program also participate in the 
alternative program, although with a different behavioral response. A per-child transfer has a 
similar effect looking at enrollment. However, the model using enrollment does induce some 
households who did not participate in RPS to participate in the alternative program by sending 
one child to school. This increased enrollment from households sending neither child to school 
under RPS is smaller than the decreased enrollment from households sending both children to 
school under RPS. The simulated impacts are statistically different from the simulated impacts of 
the RPS program for males and for those children in extreme poverty in the attendance model. 
This finding corresponds with how households specialize in order to maintain a level of 
subsistence. Boys, for instance, have higher potential earnings and can contribute more to 
household income. These households might prefer to send both children to school, but in the face 
of the harsh realities of extreme poverty, they might choose specialization. The per-household 
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transfer is able to effectively change household patterns of specialization while the per-child 
transfer does not change these patterns for most households. For the enrollment model, the 
differences between the simulated impacts of RPS and the simulated impacts of the alternative 
program are not statistically significant. 
 One of the possible explanations for this simulated change in behaviors for certain 
households when exposed to the RPS simulation relative to its exposure to the per-child 
alternative is that households, even with the income transfer, are still facing rather dire 
circumstances. Basu (1998) proposes that households only rely on child contributions to 
household income if they cannot meet basic subsistence requirements without them. Therefore, a 
per-child transfer might allow the household to specialize and approach this level of income. 
Initial evidence of this theory is provided by the fact that the changes in program attendance rates 
from RPS to the alternative program occur only for nonpoor households.  
 
5.1.2 PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 2: DIMINISHING MARGINAL PER-CHILD 
TRANSFERS 
Similarly, providing a more generous transfer per child exacerbates the changes in the impacts 
relative to the previous alternative, generating lower enrollment rates and attendance rates than 
the original RPS program and the equal per-child transfer. This finding holds across models 
using enrollment and attendance. In the attendance model, this alternative generates results that 
are statistically different and lower than the simulated original RPS for males, for young 
children, and for children in extreme poverty. In the enrollment model, simulated impacts are 
statistically different and lower than the simulated RPS program for children aged 10 to 13 and 
for boys. While the differences are only statistically significant for a small subgroup, all groups 
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non-poor households are predicted to experience lower schooling rates under this program 
alternative.  
 
5.1.3 PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 3: UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS  
 
While the income effect of a cash transfer clearly increases attendance rates for recipient 
households, the income effect alone cannot induce the same behavioral response as can a 
conditional cash transfer. Simulating the effect of an unconditional transfer provides evidence 
that the conditionality of the transfer is important in increasing educational investments across 
and within households. Looking at the transition matrices suggests that the income effect does 
reduce some intra-household inequalities in educational investments but not to the extent that a 
conditional transfer might. This analysis only simulates the impact of the transfer on schooling 
and does not model how an unconditional transfer might improve other indicators of welfare for 
those households who would not send children to school under the RPS program. The simulated 
results are statistically different and lower than the simulated RPS results for every subgroup 
except non-poor households in the attendance model. The enrollment model suggests that an 
unconditional transfer yields significantly lower enrollment rates for young and old children and 
boys. Again, all non-poor households experience simulated schooling rates that are on average 
lower than what was predicted with the RPS program.  
 
5.1.4 PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 4: DOUBLING THE SIZE OF THE TRANSFER 
 
The only program design presented in this paper that effectively reduces the percentage of 
households that send neither child to school relative to the original RPS program is the 
alternative that increases the size of the transfer for households that comply with the program 
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requirements. While this finding suggests that a small portion of households choose not to 
participate in the program because of the high costs of schooling, increasing the level of payment 
may be incompatible with governmental budget concerns. The original program was incredibly 
effective in increasing schooling rates in Nicaragua, and increasing the effectiveness of the 
program is likely to come at high costs. This program design increases the schooling rates of 
every subgroup except non-poor households relative to the original RPS program design.  
 
5.2 IMPACTS OF PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES BY SUBGROUP  
 
Another advantage of the simulation design is the opportunity to examine to whom the benefits 
of each program design is mostly likely to accrue. Tables 29 and 30 present impact estimates and 
post-treatment schooling rates for each alternative design. For each alternative that does not 
increase the benefit delivered to households, the lower program impacts are largely the result of 
the reduced schooling of children from the poorest households. The poorest households are the 
most sensitive to changes in the structure and payment level of the program. Again, if poor 
households must specialize in order meet the income necessary for basic subsistence, this result 
is expected. Males also bear more of the costs of lower schooling in alternative program designs 
relative to females, although both tend to have diminished schooling rates. This finding 
corresponds with the importance of opportunity costs in determining the schooling status of 
children. Boys face higher opportunity costs in Nicaragua, making them susceptible to low rates 
of schooling. Similarly, older children tend to be more affected by alternative program designs. 
The conditionality is also important in generating the magnitude of the impacts. The only 
program design which increases the magnitude of the impact is that of doubling the size of the 
subsidy. Because the simulation mostly uses reduced-form modeling, this analysis cannot 
provide much information about the mechanisms that are driving the differences in anticipated 
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results, although the literature can inform this aspect of the discussion. Examining these results 
suggests that the per-household transfer might have reduced intra-household inequalities in 
schooling investments relative to a per-child transfer in rural Nicaragua. Furthermore, this 
analysis provides evidence that very basic changes to the design of a program can interact with 
household decision-making in very different ways.  
 Although one might imagine that households with 2 eligible children are not very 
different from households with more than 2 eligible children, this study does not make claims 
about how alternative program design will families with 3 or more eligible children.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
6.1 DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Many papers have suggested that the level of cash transfer is important in determining the impact 
of conditional cash transfer programs on schooling rates in targeted communities (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, and Leite 2003; De Janvry and Sadoulet 2006; Todd and Wolpin 2006). However, the 
level of transfer is only one of many components that affect the magnitude of a program’s 
impacts and the groups who most benefit from a particular program. In addition to the generosity 
of a program’s benefits, designers must also consider program conditionality, household 
structure, and whether benefits are delivered on a per-child or on a flat per-household basis. 
Ignoring the interactions between eligible siblings might lead to household schooling 
investments that are below what is socially or even privately optimal. This paper attempts to 
provide some insights into the anticipated impacts of programs that delivered household benefits 
conditional on the schooling of only one eligible child, similar to Mexico’s PROGRESA and 
Honduras’s PRAF programs. Using an opportunity-cost analysis, the paper finds that per-child 
transfers might allow households to reinforce inequalities within the household while per-
household transfers seem to reduce within-household inequalities.  
 
6.2 THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF EX-ANTE EVALUATIONS  
 
Impact evaluation of social programs provides an important tool for accountability. Two families 
of impact evaluation exist: ex-post and ex-ante methods. Ex-post methods rely on an ―observed‖ 
counterfactual (a group serves as a control either by design or by program rules) while ex-ante 
methods rely on a simulated counterfactual. While random-controlled trials are considered the 
gold standard of impact evaluation, implementing experiments require large time lags between 
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the implementation and the evaluation of the program. Experiments are costly and not 
necessarily bias-free. Finally, experimental designs of social programs must account for ethical 
and political issues that arise from excluding otherwise similar people from program eligibility 
(Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2009). 
 In the absence of experimental data, researchers have relied on quasi-experimental 
evidence for impact evaluation. These methods include difference-in-differences, propensity 
score matching, instrumental variables, and regression discontinuity designs. Although these 
methods are certainly preferable to experimental trials in terms of cost and time lags, they are 
still limited in their capacity for answering particular questions about the design and delivery of a 
program.  
 Using experimental methods for questions concerning program design, payment delivery, 
or targeting are likely infeasible given reasonable time and financial budgets. One such study has 
been undertaken in South Africa using an experimental design (Baird, McIntosh and Ӧzler 
2009). Ex-ante evaluations simulate counterfactuals by making assumptions about the functional 
form of the model, beneficiary’s behaviors, general equilibrium effects, and trends. These 
methods serve as a complement to ex-post evaluations and circumvent the problems of cost 
(evaluation needs include only representative data and a computer), ethics (experiments are run 
on computers rather than people), time lags (evaluations use existing data), and the limitation of 
answerable questions (evaluations simulate counterfactuals based on assumptions) (Bourguignon 
and Ferreira 2003). While the necessary assumptions result in criticism about the method’s 
reliability, ex-ante evaluations that rely on experimental data for validation serve as a particularly 
strong complement with observed treatment effects that help support the predictive power of 
simulated counterfactuals. 
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 This paper uses ex-ante methods to examine the difference in impacts of alternative 
program designs for a conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua. This simulation validates 
its approach using experimental data. However, this ex-ante simulation is not without its 
limitations. This study provides no evidence about the general equilibrium effects of CCTs on 
child wages. One might reasonably expect that schooling will, for many children, crowd out 
wage labor. This diminished child labor supply is likely to affect wage levels and change the 
opportunity costs of schooling. Theoretical work by Basu (1998) suggests that decreased child 
labor supply will increase the wages of adult workers which might generate income effects and 
increased schooling rates. On the other hand, higher child wages increase the opportunity costs 
of schooling for children able to work which will depress schooling rates.  
Another limiting factor of this study is its inability to model the program’s direct and 
indirect impact on other measures of household welfare. The child labor response ignores the 
question of how a child’s non-school time is spent. Therefore, I cannot simulate the impacts of a 
CCT on child’s time allocation. While CCTs improve the schooling rates of children, this 
increase in time spent in school may come at the cost of child leisure rather than child labor. The 
impact evaluation conducted by Maluccio and Flores (2005) did find that RPS was successful in 
reducing the number of hours children spent working. Change in adult time allocation is another 
important household characteristics affected by RPS but neglected by this model. Maluccio and 
Flores found that men in recipient households did reduce the hours spent in the labor market 
(2005), but changes in hours spent in the labor market were small and insignificant for women. 
The impacts of the program on the time allocation and health indicators of ineligible children are 
also not addressed. CCT programs were also implemented in order to reduce short-term food 
insecurity. While this paper focuses on the effects of the program design on schooling outcomes, 
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it is unwise to neglect the other objectives of the RPS program – including increased food 
security and health indicators.  
While I do find that the impacts of alternative transfer schemes might be different than 
the impacts of a flat, per-household transfer scheme, this anticipated impact is derived from a 
sample of households with two eligible children. Households with three or more eligible children 
might respond differently to the program than households with two eligible children. Whether 
households with more eligible children are more sensitive to changes in how benefits vary is not 
clear from the evidence examined here. Only a more complete structural model is sufficient to 
approach and shed light on this sort of question.  
Additionally, this paper relies on a small sample size. Exploring a nationally 
representative dataset, I found that I could slightly increase the number of observations. 
However, these observations were far more geographically diverse, limiting the ability for a 
robust validation of my model with the experimental data. The multinomial logit uses maximum 
likelihood for estimation and multiple equations, both of which require many observations for a 
robust estimation.  
Shifts in decision-making behavior or the bargaining power of women that result from 
the introduction of the CCT in a community is not addressed in this paper. Because the program 
delivers payments directly to the primary caregiver of children (usually the mother), shifts in 
bargaining power are possible. As greater assets for women are generally associated with better 
schooling outcomes for children, the program might generate higher impact estimates than a 
strict income- and conditionality-effect analysis such as the one presented in this paper can. 
Similarly, an important assumption that this study cannot discard is that the model uses cross-
sectional income differences to predict the income effects of the CCT. If cross-sectional income 
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differences impact schooling differently than a direct cash transfer does, the model’s predictions 
are inaccurate. How shifts in decision-making behavior and income are generated in cross-
sectional data might be much different than how these shifts are generated from the direct RPS 
transfer. The differences in the mechanisms driving these shifts may very likely affect children’s 
schooling differently. 
Assumptions about the child labor response, especially its uniform discreteness, might 
bias the results. However, the direction of the bias is unknown. A household either chooses 
schooling or no schooling for each of its eligible children, and choosing schooling for a child has 
a specific, discrete effect on the time that child spends in the labor market. Therefore, the 
simulation implicitly assumes a well-functioning labor market for all children in the model 
(Bourguignon and Ferreira 2005). This assumption cannot be tested and might not be an 
appropriate reflection of the realities of rural child labor markets. Indeed, labor opportunities 
may not be available for all children in the control group. That work and schooling are not 
mutually exclusive is confirmed in both the literature and the data. However, the specific 
relationship between schooling and work is likely to differ across households. Children from 
households that are much farther from school might face a decision that requires a choice 
between schooling and work.  
 
6.2.1 PLAUSIBILITY OF IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 In addition to the aspects of household decision-making behavior that this model cannot 
capture, the analysis relies on a set of assumptions which may or may not be an accurate 
reflection of the realities of household decision-making behavior. The first assumption is that 
wage earners make their time allocation decisions independently of the schooling decision of 
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eligible children. Maluccio and Flores (2005) provide evidence that a small number of wage 
earners in treatment communities did in fact reduce the number of hours worked. However, labor 
participation was not affected, and a change in labor supply was negative and significant only for 
adult men in treatment communities relative to control communities. Therefore, while the RPS 
program may have had a slight effect on the time allocation decisions of adults, it is unlikely that 
this effect would dramatically change the schooling decisions of eligible children. A similar 
assumption is made for ineligible children. The assumption which allows for the identification of 
the proportions by which potential earnings are multiplied is that if both children attend school, 
total child income contributions are multiplied by the same proportion, MB. This assumption is 
not testable. It may hold that older children are better equipped to juggle both working and 
schooling relative to younger children. The final assumption addressed here is the assumption of 
no selection on unobservable characteristics into the labor market. Again, this assumption cannot 
be tested and plays a large role in the analysis. An examination of the literature and the 
descriptive statistics suggest that this assumption is unlikely true, although finding an alternative 
is no easy task with such a limited dataset. This assumption is likely to inflate child wages, 
leading to a slight downward bias in the results of the simulation. 
 
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the most problematic obstacles in this paper is the estimation of potential child earnings 
in each of the household occupational states. The data used for the simulation analysis does not 
include earnings information. Consequently, this paper relies on strong assumptions for how 
child wages are determined. Because this paper relies on a single draw of random residuals in 
both the wage regression and the multinomial logit regression, the model cannot be rigorously 
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validated. A better check on the robustness of this model would be collecting the simulated 
results from 1000 iterations of the simulation and then constructing confidence intervals based 
on these results. Comparing these confidence intervals to the observed results would allow for 
stronger claims about the validity of the approach used (Bornhorst 2009).  
 The model is also weak in its ability to predict which households will send only one child 
to school. Because there are so few households which have chosen these occupational states in 
the baseline relative to the number of households sending both children or neither child to 
school, the multinomial logit does not fit these observations well. Future research might limit the 
occupational states to three choices: sending both children to school, sending neither child to 
school, or sending one child to school. The model will likely increase in its predictive power, but 
it will allow for less analysis of the specializations by age rank in the discussion.  
The structural assumptions in this paper are minimized to the labor responses of children 
attending school. While using reduced-form modeling limits the number of untestable 
assumptions made for the simulation, it also reduces the household responses to very simple 
behaviors which are unlikely to reflect the reality of household responses. Future research might 
examine the simulated impacts of alternative programs using additional assumptions for a richer 
analysis of the program impacts.  
The findings in this research suggest further exploration about the ability of CCTs to 
affect intra-household patterns of time allocation. Most notably, introducing a larger transfer for 
boys relative to girls might yield interesting patterns of household educational investments.  
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6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper applies a micro-simulation method to evaluate a conditional cash transfer program in 
Nicaragua for families with 2 eligible children. The paper then validates the results of the 
simulation by comparing its results to the experimental results. After validating the methods used 
here, the paper simulates alternative program designs. The simulated impacts of alternative 
programs suggest that transfers that are delivered on a per-child basis might generate smaller 
impacts by allowing children in households to specialize in non-school activities. Although the 
data do not allow for a thorough analysis of the work-school decision within households, it is 
clear that understanding family behavior is essential for designing policies that will be effective 
in increasing the schooling and welfare of children. Using experiments to test theories about the 
household can potentially shed light on the complex decision-making process within the 
household. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
7.1 TABLES 
 
Table 1. Benefit Variation for CCT programs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 Basis of Benefit Variation 
Country/Program Income Number Cap Other Child’s age Child’s 
  of children   or grade gender 
Argentina: Programa Familias  x Max = 6 
Bolivia: Juancito Pinto  x No 
Brazil: Bolsa Alimentação  x Max = 3 x 
Brazil: Bolsa Escola  x  Max = 3 
Brazil: Bolsa Família x x Max = 3  x 
Brazil: PETI  x Yes  
Chile: Chile Solidario 
Chile: SUF  x 
Colombia: Familias en Acción  x   x 
Colombia: SCAE-Bogotá  x No  
Dominican Republic: Solidaridad  x Yes 
Dominican Republic: TAE/ILAE 
Ecuador: BDH    x 
El Salvador: Red Solidaria     x 
Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa     x 
Honduras: PRAF  x x x x 
Jamaica: PATH  x Max = 20 x x x 
Mexico: Oportunidades  x Yes x x x 
Nicaragua: Atención a Crisis  x 
Nicaragua: RPS  x
1
  
Panama: Red de Oportunidades     x 
Paraguay: Tekoporã/PROPAIS II  x Max = 4 x 
Peru: Juntos 
Table from Fiszbein et al. 
1. The largest component of the transfer is independent of household size and structure. Only the school 
supplies transfer, which comprised 16% of the total education-related transferred varied according to the 
number of children in the household.  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics by Treatment Status, 2000 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Treatment Control Difference (C-T) 
Number of Households 178 142 320 
Household 
 Size 7.258 7.669 0.411** 
  (.127) (.130) (.184) 
 Expenditures (C$/year) 22120.070 21778.79 -341.2787  
  (691.4339) (780.1084) (1041.523) 
 Total expenditures/capita (C$/year) 3328.786 3083.613 -245.174 
  (117.891) (141.311) (182.623) 
 Food expenditure/capita: (C$/year) 2292.851 2243.659 -49.192 
  (77.38) (100.328) (124.6387) 
 Number of children < 5 0.972 0.986 0.014 
  (.053) (.053) (.075) 
 Distance to school (meters) 1728.766 1885.672 156.907 
  (239.7268) (455.0717) (489.8319) 
Head of household 
 Level of education  1.826 1.634 -0.192 
  (.122) (.117) (.172) 
 Age 43.320 44.049 0.729 
  (.689) (.725) (1.007) 
 Male 0.854 0.859 0.005 
  (.019) (.021) (.028) 
Eligible children 
 Age 9.640 9.792 0.152 
  (.102) (.112) (.151) 
 Male 0.528 0.514 -0.014 
  (.026) (.030) (.040) 
 School enrollment 0.728 0.757 0.030 
  (.024) (.025) (.035) 
 School attendance 0.596 0.701 0.105*** 
  (.026) (.027) (.038) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Predicted Earnings Statistics for eligible children in control communities, 2001 
Eligible Children 
 Monthly earnings potential (predicted  874.960 
 with school attendance, in C$)  
  
 Monthly earnings potential (predicted  964.240   
 with school enrollment, in C$)  
 
Data from the IFPRI dataset evaluating the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social 
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Table 4. Means of descriptive statistics for children with wage observations in LSMS 
sample 
Statistic 2001 7-13 only: 2001 
Number of Children 404 42 
Age  16.020 11.891 
Male  0.770 0.810  
Participation in agricultural work  0.408 0.357 
School enrollment  0.332 0.643 
School attendance  0.243 0.405 
Educational level completed 4.252 2.690 
            Monthly earnings 1013.817 859.745 
Data from the 2001 Nicaraguan Living Standards and Measurement Survey 
 
 
 
Table 5. Results of the Earnings Estimation with School Attendance as an Independent 
Variable 
Log Earnings Regression for Reporting Earnings of Children Aged 7-18, 2001 
***, **, * indicate significance at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively 
Robust standard errors reported 
Statistic Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Observations 404 n.a. n.a.  
R
2
 0.068 n.a. n.a. 
Age -0.396 0.246 0.109 
Age
2
 0.016 0.009 0.060* 
Age*male 0.114 0.055 0.040** 
Age
2
*male -0.006 0.003 0.061* 
Level of education completed 0.028 0.015 0.062* 
Attends school (Dummy = 1 if child attends) -0.289 0.104 0.006*** 
Works in agriculture -0.237 0.089 0.008*** 
Rural 0.056 0.087 0.523 
Intercept 8.637 1.753 .000*** 
Data from the 2001 Nicaraguan Living Standards and Measurement Survey 
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Table 6. Results of the Earnings Estimation with School Enrollment as an Independent 
Variable 
Log Earnings Regression for Reporting Earnings of Children Aged 7-18, 2001 
***, **, * indicate significance at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively 
Robust standard errors reported 
Statistic Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Observations 404 n.a. n.a.  
R
2
 0.068 n.a. n.a. 
Age -0.429 0.242 0.077* 
Age
2
 0.017 0.009 0.044** 
Age*male 0.113 0.056 0.044** 
Age
2
*male -0.006 0.003 0.066* 
Level of education completed 0.031 0.015 0.005*** 
Enrolled in school (Dummy = 1 if enrolled) -0.291 0.094 0.002*** 
Works in agriculture -0.261 0.092 0.043** 
Rural 0.065 0.086 0.456 
Intercept 8.965 1.733 .000*** 
Data from the 2001 Nicaraguan Living Standards and Measurement Survey 
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Table 7. Multinomial Logit Model Using Attendance Results 
Results of Multinomial Logit of Attendance Occupational Choice for households with 2 children 
eligible for participation in RPS in control communities, 2001 
***, **, * indicate significance at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively 
Statistic Both children Younger eligible Older eligible 
  attend school child attends child attends 
Monthly household income 0.001*** -0.001 0.000 
 less child contribution (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
Child contribution to 0.000 -0.002** -0.000 
 household income (predicted) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
Both children are male -0.245 -2.723* 1.628** 
  (0.626) (1.425) (0.807) 
 
Older child is male,  -2.522*** -1.302 -0.543 
 younger is female (0.608) (1.024) (0.817) 
   
Older child is female, -0.529 -1.154 1.546* 
 younger is male (0.641) (1.033) (0.818) 
 
Years of education of  0.390*** -0.005 0.156 
 household head (0.131) (0.286) (0.154) 
 
Age of household head 0.010 -0.028 0.022 
  (0.021) (0.036) (0.026) 
 
Household head works in -1.026* -0.443 0.200 
 agriculture/livestock (0.541) (1.891) (0.721) 
 
Size of household 0.109 0.840** 0.036 
  (0.180) (0.341) (0.215) 
 
Number of children under five -0.477 -1.697*** -0.515 
  (0.294) (0.554) (0.357) 
 
Number of children aged -0.062 -1.337** -0.204 
 14 to 18 (0.309) (0.627) (0.367) 
 
Age of older child 0.345 1.969*** -0.138  
  (0.218) (0.440) (0.282) 
 
Difference in age -0.282 -0.778* 0.281 
  (0.246) (0.414) (0.305) 
 
Community marginality 0.050 -0.116* 0.023 
 index  (0.032) (0.070) (0.040) 
 
Intercept -4.736 -9.389* -1.888 
  (3.420) (7.164) (4.105) 
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Table 8. Simulated impact of RPS on school attendance on households in control 
communities 
Group 
n = number 
of children 
Ex-Ante RPS: Mean(Simulated Treatment) – 
Mean(Observed Control) 
   Simulation: μT – μC ζ 
All children 292 .178 .022*** 
Ages 7-9 161 .230 .033*** 
Ages 10-13 131 .115 .028*** 
Male 138 .203 .034*** 
Female 154 .156 .029*** 
Younger eligible children 143 .203 .034*** 
Older eligible children 143 .161 .031*** 
Extreme Poverty 166 .199 .031*** 
Poverty 94 .170 .039*** 
Nonpoor 32 .094 .052* 
 
 
 
Table 9. Simulated Effect of RPS on Household Schooling Decision for Eligible Children 
using Attendance as an indicator for Schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice: Attendance  
Household Choice 
Baseline 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 32.0 -- -- 68.00 17.12 
Older in school -- 33.33 -- 66.67 12.33 
Younger in school -- -- 40.0 60.00 6.85 
Both in school -- -- -- 100.00 63.70 
Total 5.48 4.11 2.74 87.67 100.0 
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Table 10. Results from Multinomial Logit Regression using Enrollment 
Results of Multinomial Logit of Enrollment Occupational Choice for households with 2 children 
eligible for participation in RPS in control communities, 2001 
***, **, * indicate significance at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively 
Statistic Both children Younger eligible Older eligible 
  attend school child attends child attends 
Monthly household income 0.002*** 0.001 0.001* 
 less child contribution (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Child contribution to 0.001** 0.000 0.001 
 household income (predicted) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Both children are male -0.433 -2.361* 1.004* 
  (0.764) (1.317) (0.945) 
 
Older child is male,  -3.249*** -1.523 -1.541 
 younger is female (0.809) (1.057) (0.998)   
 
Older child is female, -0.889 -2.146* 0.557 
 younger is male (0.766) (1.220) (0.937) 
 
Years of education of  1.028*** 0.601* 0.630** 
 household head (0.251) (0.331) (0.277) 
 
Age of household head 0.055** 0.030* 0.058* 
  (0.028) (0.038) (0.032) 
 
Household head works in -0.845 0.860* -0.364 
 agriculture/livestock (0.602) (1.001) (0.747) 
 
Size of household -0.243 0.399* -0.237 
  (0.232) (0.336) (0.270) 
 
Number of children aged -0.056 -0.971* 0.114 
 five or younger (0.346) (0.570) (0.419) 
 
Number of children aged 0.395 -0.582 0.232 
 14 to 18 (0.381) (0.616) (0.438) 
 
Age of older child -0.473* 0.694* -0.601*   
  (0.255) (0.387) (0.323)   
 
Difference in age 0.904*** 0.191 1.200*** 
  (0.309) (0.421) (0.370) 
 
Community marginality 0.115*** -0.028 0.092** 
 index  (0.039) (0.058) (0.046) 
 
Intercept -5.323 -8.762* -5.542 
  (3.793) (6.383) (4.494) 
  
 81 
Table 11. Simulated impact of RPS on school enrollment on households in control 
communities 
Group 
n = number 
of children 
Ex-Ante RPS: Mean(Simulated Treatment) – 
Mean(Observed Control) 
   μT – μC ζ 
All children 292 .144 .021*** 
Ages 7-9 161 .174 .030*** 
Ages 10-13 131 .107 .027*** 
Male 138 .174 .032*** 
Female 154 .117 .026*** 
Younger eligible children 143 .168 .031*** 
Older eligible children 143 .126 .028*** 
Extreme Poverty 166 .157 .028*** 
Poverty 94 .128 .35*** 
Nonpoor 32 .125 .059** 
 
 
 
Table 12. Transition Matrix 
 Simulated Household Choice: Enrollment  
Household Choice 
Baseline 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 25.00 -- -- 75.00 10.96 
Older in school -- 29.41 -- 70.59 11.64 
Younger in school -- -- 40.00 60.00 6.85 
Both in school -- -- -- 100.00 70.55 
Total 2.74 3.42 2.74 91.10 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 13. Parameters Used in Utility Functions 
Parameter Attendance Enrollment 
α0 .003 .001 
α1 .004 .003 
α2 .002 .002 
α3 .003 .002 
β0 .003 .001 
β1 .003 .002 
β2 .001 .001 
β3 .003 .002 
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Table 14. Parameters used to Identify Child Income Contributions 
Parameter Attendance Enrollment 
MB .7487 .7452 
MO .8146 .8577 
MY .4085 .5940 
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Table 15. Comparison of program impact estimates using attendance rates 
Attendance rates by 
group 
Ex-post difference-in-differences: 
RPS 
Ex-post t-test: RPS 
mean(observed treatment) – 
mean(observed control) 
Ex-ante: RPS 
mean(simulated treatment) – 
mean(observed control) 
  Impact (β) P-value μT – μC ζ μT – μC ζ 
All children .304 0.000 .199 .027*** .178 .022*** 
Ages 7-9 .431 0.000 .283 .036*** .230 .033*** 
Ages 10-13 .166 0.015 .098 .041** .115 .028*** 
Male .359 0.000 .243 .040*** .203 .034*** 
Female .252 0.000 .161 .036*** .156 .029*** 
Younger eligible children .361 0.000 .252 .038*** .203 .034*** 
Older eligible children .258 0.000 .158 .040*** .161 .031*** 
Extreme Poverty .298 0.000 .239 .038*** .199 .031*** 
Poverty .177 0.058 .158 .046*** .170 .039*** 
Nonpoor .197 0.185 .104 .055* .094 .052* 
 
 
 
Table 16. Comparison of post-program attendance rates 
Group 
Observed attendance 
rates in treatment groups 
Simulated attendance 
rates in control group 
Difference in 
attendance rates 
All children 93.19% 91.10% 2.09% 
Ages 7-9 96.90% 91.30% 5.60% 
Ages 10-13 89.20% 90.84% -1.64% 
Male 92.39% 88.41% 3.98% 
Female 94.05% 93.51% 0.54% 
Younger eligible children 95.14% 90.21% 4.93% 
Older eligible children 91.35% 91.61% -0.26% 
Extreme poverty 91.98% 87.95% 4.03% 
Poverty 93.44% 94.68% -1.24% 
Nonpoor 97.92% 96.88% 1.04% 
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Table 17. Comparison of post-program household occupational status with attendance for schooling 
Household Choice 
Percentage in treatment 
group 
Simulated percentage in 
control group 
Differences in percentage 
for each household choice 
Both children attend 89.53% 87.67% 1.86% 
Neither child attends 3.66% 5.48% -1.82% 
Younger child attends 5.24% 2.74% 2.50% 
Older child attends 1.57% 4.11% -2.54% 
 
 
 
Table 18. Comparison of program impact estimates using enrollment rates 
Enrollment rates by group Ex-post RPS: 
mean(Observed Treatment) – 
mean(Observed Control) 
Ex-ante RPS: 
mean(Simulated Treatment) – 
mean(Observed Control) 
  μT – μC ζ μT – μC ζ 
All children .158 .024 *** .144 .021*** 
Ages 7-9 .212 .032*** .174 .030*** 
Ages 10-13 .092 .035*** .107 .027*** 
Male .201 .036*** .174 .032*** 
Female .119 .032*** .117 .026*** 
Younger eligible children .204 .034*** .168 .031*** 
Older eligible children .122 .035*** .126 .028*** 
Extreme poverty .215 .033*** .157 .028*** 
Poverty .073 .041* .128 .35*** 
Nonpoor .104 .055* .125 .059** 
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Table 19. Comparison of post-program enrollment rates 
Group 
Observed enrollment 
rates in treatment groups 
Simulated enrollment 
rates in control group 
Difference in 
enrollment rates 
All children 95.55% 94.96% 0.59% 
Ages 7-9 97.57% 95.91% 1.66% 
Ages 10-13 93.18% 93.81% -0.63% 
Male 95.43% 94.33% 1.10% 
Female 95.68% 95.58% 0.10% 
Younger eligible children 97.30% 95.73% 1.57% 
Older eligible children 94.05% 94.21% -0.16% 
Extreme poverty 96.23% 93.65% 2.58% 
Poverty 93.44% 95.83% -2.39% 
Nonpoor 97.92% 98.75% -0.83% 
 
 
 
Table 20. Comparison of post-program household occupational status with enrollment as indicator 
Household Choice 
Percentage in treatment 
group 
Simulated percentage in 
control group 
Differences in percentage 
for each household choice 
Both children are enrolled 92.15% 91.10% 1.05% 
Neither child is enrolled 1.57% 2.74% -1.17% 
Younger child is enrolled 4.71% 2.74% 1.97% 
Older child is enrolled 1.57% 3.42% -1.85% 
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Table 21. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 1 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using attendance as indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 100.00 -- -- -- 5.48 
Older in school -- 100.00 -- -- 4.11 
Younger in school -- -- 100.0 -- 2.74 
Both in school -- 2.34 0.78 96.88 87.67 
Total 5.48 6.16 3.42 84.93 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 22. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 1 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using enrollment as indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 75.00 25.00 -- -- 2.74 
Older in school -- 100.00 -- -- 3.42 
Younger in school -- -- 100.00 -- 2.74 
Both in school -- 1.50 1.50 96.99 91.10 
Total 2.05 4.11 5.48 88.36 100.00 
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Table 23. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 2 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using attendance as an indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 100.00 -- -- -- 5.48 
Older in school -- 100.00 -- -- 4.11 
Younger in school -- -- 100.00 -- 2.74 
Both in school -- 3.13 0.78 96.09 87.67 
Total 5.48 6.85 3.42 84.25 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 24. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 2 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using enrollment as an indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 75.00 25.00 -- -- 2.74 
Older in school -- 100.00 -- -- 3.42 
Younger in school -- -- 100.00 -- 2.74 
Both in school -- 2.26 2.26 95.49 91.10 
Total 2.05 6.16 4.79 86.99 100.00 
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Table 25. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 3 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using attendance as an indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 100.00 -- -- -- 5.48 
Older in school -- 100.00 -- -- 4.11 
Younger in school -- -- 100.00 -- 2.74 
Both in school 2.34 3.91 0.78 92.97 87.67 
Total 7.53 7.53 3.42 81.51 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 26. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 3 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using enrollment as an indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 75.00 25.00 --  2.74 
Older in school -- 100.00 -- -- 3.42 
Younger in school -- -- 100.00 -- 2.74 
Both in school -- 3.01 2.26 94.74 91.10 
Total 2.05 6.85 4.79 86.30 100.00 
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Table 27. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 4 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using attendance as an indicator for schooling 
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 50.00 -- -- 50.00 5.48 
Older in school -- 33.33 -- 66.67 4.11 
Younger in school -- -- 75.00 25.00 2.74 
Both in school -- -- -- 100.00 87.67 
Total 2.74 2.74 2.05 92.47 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 28. Simulated Effect of CCT Alternative 4 on Household Schooling Decision for 
Eligible Children using enrollment as an indicator for schooling  
 Simulated Household Choice  
Household Choice  
RPS-Simulated 
Neither in 
school 
Older in 
school 
Younger in 
school 
Both in 
school Total 
Neither in school 25.00 -- -- 75.00 2.74 
Older in school -- 40.00 -- 60.00 3.42 
Younger in school -- -- 75.00 25.00 2.74 
Both in school -- -- -- 100.00 91.10 
Total 0.68 2.05 1.37 95.89 100.00 
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Table 29. Simulated Change in Attendance Rates across Program Designs 
Impact estimates report difference in simulated and observed attendance rates from program 
simulation and observed control groups 
Difference from RPS simulated results reported in parentheses 
Group 
RPS-
Simulation Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
All Children 17.81% 16.44% 16.10% 13.70% 21.58% 
  
(-1.37%) (-1.71%) (-4.11%) (3.77%) 
Age 7-9 22.98% 21.74% 21.12% 18.01% 27.95% 
  
(-1.24%) (-1.86%) (-4.97%) (4.97%) 
Age 10-13 11.45% 9.92% 9.92% 8.40% 13.74% 
  
(-1.53%) (-1.53%) (-3.05%) (2.29%) 
Male 20.29% 18.12% 17.39% 13.77% 24.64% 
  
(-2.17%) (-2.90%) (-6.52%) (4.35%) 
Female 15.58% 14.94% 14.94% 13.64% 18.83% 
  
(-0.64%) (-0.64%) (-1.94%) (3.25%) 
Extreme Poverty 19.88% 18.07% 17.47% 15.66% 25.30% 
  
(-1.81%) (-2.41%) (-4.22%) (5.42%) 
Poverty 17.02% 15.96% 15.96% 11.70% 19.15% 
  
(-1.06%) (-1.06%) (-5.32%) (2.13%) 
Nonpoor 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 
 
  (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
 
 
 
Table 30. Attendance Rates after Simulation 
Group 
RPS-
Simulation Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
All Children 91.10% 89.73% 89.38% 86.99% 94.86% 
Age 7-9 91.30% 90.06% 89.44% 86.34% 96.27% 
Age 10-13 90.84% 89.31% 89.31% 87.79% 93.13% 
Male 88.41% 86.23% 85.51% 81.88% 92.75% 
Female 93.51% 92.86% 92.86% 91.56% 96.75% 
Extreme Poverty 87.95% 86.14% 85.54% 83.73% 93.37% 
Poverty 94.68% 93.62% 93.62% 89.36% 96.81% 
Nonpoor 96.88% 96.88% 96.88% 96.88% 96.88% 
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Table 31. Simulated Change from Baseline Enrollment Rates across Program Designs 
Impact estimates report difference in simulated and observed enrollment rates from program 
simulation and observed control groups 
Difference from RPS simulated results reported in parentheses 
Group 
RPS-
Simulation Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
All Children 14.38% 13.36% 12.67% 12.33% 17.81% 
  
(-1.02%) (-1.71%) (-2.05%) (3.43%) 
Age 7-9 17.39% 16.77% 16.15% 15.53% 21.74% 
  
(-0.62%) (-1.24%) (-1.86%) (4.35%) 
Age 10-13 10.69% 9.16% 8.40% 8.40% 12.98% 
  
(-1.53%) (-2.29%) (-2.29%) (2.29%) 
Male 17.39% 15.94% 14.49% 13.77% 21.74% 
  
(-1.45%) (-2.90%) (-3.62%) (4.35%) 
Female 11.69% 11.04% 11.04% 11.04% 14.29% 
  
(-0.65%) (-0.65%) (-0.65%) (2.60%) 
Extreme Poverty 15.66% 14.46% 13.86% 13.25% 21.08% 
  
(-1.20%) (-1.80%) (-2.41%) (5.42%) 
Poverty 12.77% 11.70% 11.70% 11.70% 13.83% 
  
(-1.07%) (-1.07%) (-1.07%) (1.06%) 
Nonpoor 12.50% 12.50% 9.38% 9.38% 12.50% 
  
(0.00%) (-3.12%) (-3.12%) (0.00%) 
 
 
 
Table 32. Enrollment Rates after Simulation 
Group 
RPS-
Simulation Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
All Children 94.18% 93.15% 92.47% 92.12% 97.60% 
Age 7-9 93.79% 93.17% 92.55% 91.93% 98.14% 
Age 10-13 94.66% 93.13% 92.37% 92.37% 96.95% 
Male 92.75% 91.30% 89.86% 89.13% 97.10% 
Female 95.45% 94.81% 94.81% 94.81% 98.05% 
Extreme Poverty 90.36% 89.16% 88.55% 87.95% 95.78% 
Poverty 98.94% 97.87% 97.87% 97.87% 100.00% 
Nonpoor 100.00% 100.00% 96.88% 96.88% 100.00% 
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7.2 FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Scatter plot of monthly child earnings by age for children aged 7 to 18 
Data from 2001 Nicaraguan Living Standards and Measurement Survey 
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Figure 2. A Comparison of Simulated and Observed Program Impacts on Attendance 
Rates by Subgroup
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Figure 3. A Comparison of Simulated and Observed Program Impacts on Enrollment 
Rates by Subgroup 
 
  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Es
ti
m
at
e
 o
f 
Im
p
ac
t 
Group 
RPS: μT – μC 
Simulation: μT – μC 
 95 
WORKS CITED 
 
Alderman, Harold, Jere R. Behrman, Victor Lavy, and Rekha Menon. 2001. ―Child Health and  
School Enrollment: A Longitudinal Analysis.‖ The Journal of Human Resources 36, no. 
1: 185-205. 
 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Jӧrn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An  
Empiricist’s Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Attanasio O, Meghir C, Santiago A. 2009. Education Choices in Mexico: Using a Structural  
Model and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate Progresa. Working paper. 
Washington, D.C.: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, Web.  
 
Ayalew, Tekabe. 2005. "Parental Preference, Heterogeneity, and Human Capital Inequality."  
Economic Development & Cultural Change 53, no. 2: 381-407. 
Azevedo V, Bouillon C, Yáñez-Pagans P. 2009. How Much Are We Willing to Pay to Send Poor  
Adolescents to School? Simulating Changes to Mexico's Oportunidades in Urban Areas. 
Working paper no. 680. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, Print. 
 
Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Ӧzler. 2009. Designing Cost-Effective Cash Transfer  
Programs to Boost Schooling among Young Women in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unpublished 
Manuscript. 
 
Basu, Kaushik, and Pham Hoang Van. 1998. "The Economics of Child Labor." American  
Economic Review 88, no. 3: 412-427. 
 
Black, S., Devereux, P., and Salvanes K.. 2005. ―The More the Merrier? The Effect of Family  
Size and Birth Order on Children’s Education.‖ The Quarterly Journal of Economics.  
120 (2): 669-700. 
 
Booth, Alison L., and Kee Hiau Joo. 2009. "Birth order matters: the effect of family size and  
birth order on educational attainment." Journal of Population Economics 22,  
no. 2: 367-397.  
 
Bornhorst, F. 2009. ―How Good Are Ex Ante Program Evaluation Techniques? The Case of  
School Enrollment in PROGRESA.‖ Working paper no. 187. International  
Monetary Fund.  
 
Bourguignon, François, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Phillippe G. Leite. 2003. "Conditional  
Cash Transfers, Schooling, and Child Labor: Micro-Simulating Brazil's Bolsa Escola 
Program." World Bank Economic Review 17, no. 2: 229-254.  
 
  
 96 
Bourguignon, François, Francisco H.G. Ferreira. 2005. ―Ex Ante Evaluation of Policy Reforms  
Using Behavioral Models.‖ 
 
Caldés, Natàlia, and John A. Maluccio. 2005. "The cost of conditional cash transfers." Journal of  
International Development 17, no. 2: 151-168. 
 
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2009. Microeconometrics Using Stata. Stata Press.  
College Station, Texas.  
 
Dammert, A. C. 2008. Child labor and schooling response to changes in coca production in rural  
Peru. Journal of Development Economics 86, (1): 164-180. 
 
Dammert, A. C. 2009. ―Heterogeneous impacts of conditional cash transfers: Evidence from  
Nicaragua.‖ Economic Development and Cultural Change 58, (1): 53-83. 
 
Dammert, Ana C. 2010. "Siblings, child labor, and schooling in Nicaragua and Guatemala."  
Journal of Population Economics 23, no. 1: 199-224.  
 
de Janvry, A., and E. Sadoulet. 2006. Making conditional cash transfer programs more efficient:  
Designing for maximum effect of the conditionality. World Bank Economic Review  
20, (1): 1-29.  
 
de Janvry, A., F. Finan, E. Sadoulet, and R. Vakis. 2006. Can conditional cash transfer programs  
serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from working when exposed to 
shocks? Journal of Development Economics 79, (2): 349-373. 
 
Del Carpio, Ximena and Karen Macours. 2009. Leveling the intra-household playing field:  
Compensation and Specialization in Child Labor Allocation. World Bank.  
Working Paper 4822.  
 
Duryea, Suzanne, and Mary Arends-Kuenning. 2003. "School Attendance, Child Labor and  
Local Labor Market Fluctuations in Urban Brazil." World Development 31, no. 7: 1165.  
 
Edmonds, Eric V., 2008. "Child Labor," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.  
 
Filmer, D., and N. Schady. 2010. Does more cash in conditional cash transfer programs always  
lead to larger impacts on school attendance? Journal of Development Economics. 
 
Fiszbein A, Schady N, Ferreira F, Kelleher N, Olinto P, Skoufias E. 2009. Conditional cash  
transfers. Reducing present and future poverty, World Bank Policy Research Report, 
Washington DC. 
 
Freije, S., Bando, R., and Arce, F. 2006. Conditional Transfers, Labor Supply, and Poverty:  
Microsimulating Oportunidades. Economia 7, no. 1: 73-120. 
 
  
 97 
Freese, J. and J. Scott Long. 2006. Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model.  
Indiana University. Unpublished. 
 
Glewwe, P., and E. Miguel. 2008. ―The Impact of Child Health and Nutrition on Education in  
Less Developed Countries.‖ Handbook of Development Economics. 56, 4: 3561-3606. 
 
Glewwe, P. and P. Olinto. 2004. ―Evaluating the impact of conditional cash transfers on  
schooling: An experimental analysis of Honduras’ PRAF program.‖ University  
of Minnesota. 
 
Gitter, S. R., and B. L. Barham. 2008. ―Women's power, conditional cash transfers, and  
schooling in Nicaragua.‖ World Bank Economic Review 22, (2): 271-290. 
 
Hanushek, E. A. 1992. The trade-off between child quantity and quality. Journal of Political  
Economy 100, (1): 84. 
 
Himaz, Rozana. 2010. "Intrahousehold Allocation of Education Expenditure: The Case of Sri  
Lanka." Economic Development & Cultural Change 58, no. 2: 231-258.  
 
IFPRI Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social (RPS) Evaluation Dataset, 2000-2002. 2005.  
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)(datasets). 
http://www.ifpri.org/dataset/nicaragua. 
 
Jungmin Lee. (2008) Sibling size and investment in children’s education: an Asian instrument.  
Journal of Population Economics 21:4, 855-875. 
 
Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi. 2002. "The Gender Gap in Educational Attainment in India." Journal of  
Development Studies 39, no. 2: 25.  
 
Khandker, Shahidur R., Gayatri B. Koolwal, and Hussain A. Samad. 2009. Handbook on Impact  
Evaluation: Quantitative Methods and Practices. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 
 
Maluccio, J. A. 2009. ―Household targeting in practice: The Nicaraguan Red de Protección  
Social.‖ Journal of International Development 21, (1): 1-23. 
 
Maluccio, J. 2010. ―The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Investment  
in Nicaragua.‖ Journal of Development Studies 46, no. 1: 14-38. 
 
Maluccio, J. A., and R. Flores. 2005. ―Impact evaluation of a conditional cash transfer program:  
The Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social.‖ Research Report of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute(141): 1-66.  
 
Maluccio, J., Murphy, A. and Regalia, F., 2010. ―Does supply matter? Initial schooling  
conditions and the effectiveness of conditional cash transfers for grade progression in 
Nicaragua.‖ Journal of Development Effectiveness, 2 (1), 87–116. 
 
 98 
Olinto, P. and B. N. Nielsen. 2006. ―Do Conditional Cash Transfers Crowd Out Private 
Transfers? Evidence from Randomized Trials in Honduras and Nicaragua‖. Unpublished 
paper. Department of Economics. Princeton University. 
 
William Parish and Robert Willis. 1993. ―Daughters, Education, and Family Budgets: Taiwan  
Experiences,‖ Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 863–898. 
 
Patrinos, H. A., and G. Psacharopoulos. 1997. Family size, schooling and child labor in peru - an  
empirical analysis. Journal of Population Economics 10, (4): 387-405.  
 
Powell B, Steelman LC. 1993. The Educational Benefits of Being Spaced Out: Sibship Density 
and Educational Progress. American Sociological Review 58:367–381.  
 
Rangel M. 2008. ―Is Parental Love Colorblind? Allocation of Resources within Mixed 
Families‖ BREAD Working paper No.167. 
 
Rosenzweig, M. R., and K. I. Wolpin. 1980. Testing the quantity-quality fertility model: The use  
of twins as a natural experiment. Econometrica 48, (1): 227-240. 
 
Sawada, Yasuyuki, and Michael Lokshin. 2009. "Obstacles to school progression in rural  
Pakistan: An analysis of gender and sibling rivalry using field survey data." Journal of 
Development Economics 88, no. 2: 335-347.  
 
Schmeer, Kammi K. 2009. "Changing Sibship Size and Educational Progress During Childhood:  
Evidence From the Philippines." Journal of Marriage & Family 71, no. 3: 787-801.  
 
Skoufias, Emmanuel. 2005. ―PROGRESA and its impacts on the welfare of rural households in  
Mexico.‖ Research Report of the International Food Policy Research Institute 139. 
 
Stecklov, Guy, Paul Winters, Jessica Todd, and Ferdinando Regalia. 2007. ―Unintended effects  
of poverty programmes on childbearing in less developed countries: Experimental 
evidence from Latin America.‖ Population Studies 61, no. 2: 125-140.  
 
StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical Software: Release 11. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.  
 
Thomas, Ranjeeta. 2010. Conditional Cash Transfers to Improve Education and Health: An Ex  
Ante Evaluation of Red de Protección Social, Nicaragua. The University of York: 
Health, Econometrics, and Data Group. Working Paper.  
 
Thomas, Duncan, Robert Schoeni, and John Strauss. 1996. ―Parental Investments in Schooling:  
The Roles of Gender and Resources in Urban Brazil,‖ RAND Labor and Population 
Program, Working Paper Series 96-02. 
 
Todd P, Wolpin K. 2006. ―Using Experimental Data to Validate a Dynamic Behavioral Model of  
Child Schooling and Fertility: Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in 
Mexico‖, American Economic Review, 96(5): 1384—141. 
 99 
 
Train, Kenneth. 2009. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press.  
Second Edition.  
 
Vakis, Renos, Diana Kruger, and Andrew D. Mason. 2004. Shocks and Coffee: Lessons from  
Nicaragua. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series.  
 
Winters, Paul, Guy Stecklov, and Jessica Todd. 2009. ―Household Structure and Short-Run  
Economic Change in Nicaragua.‖ Journal of Marriage & Family 71, no. 3: 708-726.  
 
World Bank. 2003. Nicaragua Poverty Assessment: Raising Welfare and Reducing Vulnerability.  
Report No. 26128-NI. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.  
 
Yamauchi, Futoshi. 2008. "Early Childhood Nutrition, Schooling, and Sibling Inequality in a  
Dynamic Context: Evidence from South Africa." Economic Development & Cultural 
Change 56, no. 3: 657-682.  
  
 100 
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table A.1. Difference-in-differences Estimate 
Differences-in-differences estimate of the impact of RPS on school attendance 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively 
Statistic Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Treated dummy*Year 2001 dummy 0.304 0.046 0.000 
Treated dummy -0.105 0.033 0.002  
Year 2001 dummy 0.032 0.035 0.354 
Intercept 0.701 0.025 0.000 
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Table A.2. Predictive Power of RPS Simulation using school attendance as indicator for 
schooling 
Group 
Mean(Observed Treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children 0.021 0.021 
Ages 7-9 0.053 0.024** 
Ages 10-13 -0.016 0.035 
Male 0.040 0.032 
Female 0.005 0.026 
Younger eligible children 0.049 0.028* 
Older eligible children -0.003 0.031 
Extreme poverty 0.040 0.031 
Poverty -0.012 0.033 
Nonpoor 0.011 0.036 
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Table A.3. Testing for significantly different impacts of equal per-child transfers for the 
Nicaraguan CCT (Attendance) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children -0.014 0.007** 
Ages 7-9 -0.012 0.009 
Ages 10-13 -0.015 0.011 
Male -0.022 0.012* 
Female -0.006 0.006 
Extreme poverty -0.018 0.010* 
Poverty -0.011 0.011 
Nonpoor 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
Table A.4. Testing for significantly different impacts of diminishing marginal per-child 
transfers for the Nicaraguan CCT (Attendance) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children -0.017 0.008** 
Ages 7-9 -0.019 0.011* 
Ages 10-13 -0.015 0.011 
Male -0.029 0.014** 
Female -0.006 0.006 
Extreme poverty -0.024 0.012** 
Poverty -0.011 0.011 
Nonpoor 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.5. Testing for significantly different impacts of unconditional transfers for the 
Nicaraguan CCT (Attendance) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children -0.041 0.012*** 
Ages 7-9 -0.050 0.017*** 
Ages 10-13 -0.031 0.015** 
Male -0.065 0.021*** 
Female -0.019 0.011* 
Extreme poverty -0.042 0.016*** 
Poverty -0.053 0.023** 
Nonpoor 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
Table A.6. Testing for significantly different impacts of doubled transfers for the 
Nicaraguan CCT (Attendance) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children 0.038 0.011*** 
Ages 7-9 0.050 0.017*** 
Ages 10-13 0.023 0.013* 
Male 0.043 0.017** 
Female 0.032 0.014** 
Extreme poverty 0.054 0.018*** 
Poverty 0.021 0.015 
Nonpoor 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.7. Predictive Power of RPS Simulation using school enrollment as indicator for 
schooling 
Group 
Mean(Observed Treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children 0.014 0.017 
Ages 7-9 0.038 0.021* 
Ages 10-13 -0.015 0.028 
Male 0.027 0.026 
Female 0.002 0.022 
Younger eligible children 0.036 -0.036 
Older eligible children -0.004 0.026 
Extreme poverty 0.059 0.025** 
Poverty -0.055 0.027** 
Nonpoor -0.021 0.026 
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Table. A.8. Testing for significantly different impacts of equal per-child transfers for the 
Nicaraguan CCT (Enrollment) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children -0.010 0.008 
Ages 7-9 -0.006 0.006 
Ages 10-13 -0.015 0.015 
Male -0.014 0.010 
Female -0.006 0.011 
Extreme poverty -0.012 0.012 
Poverty -0.011 0.011 
Nonpoor 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
Table A.9. Testing for significantly different impacts of diminishing marginal per-child 
transfers for the Nicaraguan CCT (Enrollment) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children -0.017 0.009* 
Ages 7-9 -0.012 0.012 
Ages 10-13 -0.023 0.013* 
Male -0.029 0.014** 
Female -0.006 0.011 
Extreme poverty -0.018 0.013 
Poverty -0.011 0.011 
Nonpoor -0.031 0.031 
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Table A.10. Testing for significantly different impacts of unconditional transfers for the 
Nicaraguan CCT (Enrollment) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children -0.021 0.010** 
Ages 7-9 -0.019 0.014** 
Ages 10-13 -0.023 0.013* 
Male -0.036 0.016** 
Female -0.006 0.011 
Extreme poverty -0.024 0.015 
Poverty -0.011 0.011 
Nonpoor -0.031 0.031 
 
 
 
Table A.11. Testing for significantly different impacts of doubled transfers for the 
Nicaraguan CCT (Enrollment) 
Group 
Mean(Alternative simulated treatment) –  
Mean(Simulated Treatment) 
  μT – μC ζ 
All children 0.034 0.011*** 
Ages 7-9 0.043 0.016*** 
Ages 10-13 0.023 0.013* 
Male 0.043 0.017** 
Female 0.026 0.013** 
Extreme poverty 0.054 0.018*** 
Poverty 0.011 0.011 
Nonpoor 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.12. Summary Statistics for children aged 7-9 by Treatment Status, 2000 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 133 174 307 
Household    
Size 7.684 7.029 0.655 
 
(0.192) (0.166) (0.166)** 
Expenditures (C$/year) 20728.720 21976.020 -1247.295 
 
(1084.413) (995.13) (1481.389) 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 2849.431 3320.324 -470.893 
 
(177.404) (161.704) (241.386)* 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 2047.291 2338.615 -291.324 
 
(121.974) (113.345) (167.872)* 
Number of children < 5 1.060 0.966 0.095 
 
(0.078) (0.069) (0.104) 
Distance to school (meters) 1941.053 1588.792 352.261 
 
(655.673) (319.947) (685.130) 
Household Head 
   Level of education 1.827 1.816 0.011 
 
(0.196) (0.171) (.259) 
Age 43.534 40.500 3.034 
 
(1.123) (0.949) (1.463)** 
Male 0.865 0.862 0.003 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.040) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 8.075 7.943 0.133 
 
(0.070) (0.063) (0.095) 
Male 0.534 0.500 0.034 
 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.058) 
School enrollment 0.797 0.736 0.061 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.049) 
School attendance 0.752 0.603 0.148 
 
(.038) (0.037) (0.054)*** 
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Table A.13. Summary Statistics for children aged 10-13 by Treatment Status, 2000 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 151 182 333 
Household    
Size 7.656 7.478 0.178 
 
(0.178) (0.191) (0.265) 
Expenditures (C$/year) 22703.690 22257.800 445.896 
 
(1111.669) (963.849) (1464.576) 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 3289.879 3336.876 -46.998 
 
(214.146) (171.539) (271.125) 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 2416.619 2249.099 167.520 
 
(154.143) (105.878) (182.262) 
Number of children < 5 0.921 0.978 -0.057 
 
(0.071) (0.079) (0.109) 
Distance to school (meters) 1834.758 1866.822 -32.064 
 
(634.608) (357.321) (701.592) 
Household Head 
   Level of education 1.464 1.835 -0.372 
 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.227) 
Age 44.503 46.016 -1.513 
 
(0.940) (0.957) (1.355) 
Male 0.854 0.846 0.008 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.039) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 11.305 11.264 0.041 
 
(0.090) (0.079) (0.119) 
Male 0.497 0.555 -0.058 
 
(0.041) (0.037) (0.055) 
School enrollment 0.722 0.720 0.002 
 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.050) 
School attendance 0.656 0.588 0.068 
 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.053) 
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Table A.14. Summary Statistics for boys by Treatment Status, 2000 (Standard Errors in 
Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 146 188 334 
Household    
Size 7.596 7.287 0.309 
 
(0.190) (0.171) (0.256) 
Expenditures (C$/year) 22651.340 22955.650 -304.316 
 
(1264.744) (1037.225) (1620.927) 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 3251.457 3454.135 -202.678 
 
(233.892) (178.886) (289.276) 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 2365.208 2312.306 52.902 
 
(160.37) (115.834) (192.988) 
Number of children < 5 0.966 0.941 0.024 
 
(0.075) (0.074) (0.106) 
Distance to school (meters) 2427.500 1469.173 958.327 
 
(866.661) (293.297) (830.097) 
Household Head 
   Level of education 1.630 1.979 -0.349 
 
(0.163) (0.173) (0.243) 
Age 44.240 42.090 2.149 
 
(0.996) (0.859) (1.311) 
Male 0.856 0.851 0.005 
 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.039) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 9.753 9.755 -0.002 
 
(0.167) (0.139) (0.215) 
Male -- -- -- 
    School enrollment 0.719 0.718 0.001 
 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.050) 
School attendance 0.664 0.548 0.117 
 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.054)** 
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Table A.15. Summary Statistics for girls by Treatment Status, 2000 (Standard Errors in 
Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 138 168 306 
Household    
Size 7.746 7.226 0.520 
 
(0.177) (0.191) (0.265)* 
Expenditures (C$/year) 20855.670 21185.020 -329.350 
 
(885.372) (891.93) (1269.841) 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 2906.038 3188.515 -282.477 
 
(152.27) (149.28) (214.889) 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 2115.064 2271.081 -156.017 
 
(117.294) (100.765) (153.821) 
Number of children < 5 1.007 1.006 0.001 
 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.107) 
Distance to school (meters) 1334.661 2030.978 -696.317 
 
(253.094) (390.213) (478.928) 
Household Head 
   Level of education 1.638 1.655 -0.017 
 
(0.169) (0.169) (0.242) 
Age 43.848 44.696 -0.849 
 
(1.059) (1.092) (1.541) 
Male 0.862 0.857 0.005 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.040) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 9.833 9.512 0.321 
 
(0.149) (0.149) (0.213) 
Male -- -- -- 
    School enrollment 0.797 0.738 0.059 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.049) 
School attendance 0.739 0.649 0.090 
 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.053)* 
 
  
 111 
Table A.16. Summary Statistics for households in extreme poverty by treatment status, 
2000 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 168 166 334 
Household    
Size 8.107 7.892 0.216 
 
(0.160) (0.194) (0.251) 
Expenditures (C$/year) 14528.270 12922.660 1605.608 
 
(398.797) (467.937) (614.257)*** 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 1812.827 1700.036 112.791 
 
(38.313) (50.232) (63.077)* 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 1318.421 1196.215 122.206 
 
(34.734) (42.619) (54.916)** 
Number of children < 5 1.179 1.145 0.034 
 
(0.067) (0.082) (0.106) 
Distance to school (meters) 2319.928 2193.049 126.878 
 
(752.845) (505.824) (931.383) 
Household Head 
   Level of education 1.512 1.494 0.018 
 
(0.155) (0.149) (0.215) 
Age 44.679 43.723 0.956 
 
(1.008) (1.036) (1.446) 
Male 0.857 0.855 0.002 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.039) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 9.726 9.530 0.196 
 
(0.146) (0.154) (0.212) 
Male 0.518 0.524 -0.006 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.055) 
School enrollment 0.738 0.645 0.094 
 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.050)** 
School attendance 0.667 0.536 0.131 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.053)** 
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Table A.17. Summary Statistics for poor households by treatment status, 2000 (Standard 
Errors in Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 84 138 222 
Household    
Size 7.405 7.058 0.347 
 
(0.220) (0.173) (0.280) 
Expenditures (C$/year) 27291.120 26465.690 825.430 
 
(900.821) (773.393) (1215.277) 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 3745.297 3761.069 -15.772 
 
(75.988) (56.464) (93.550) 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 2781.828 2690.040 91.788 
 
(78.301) (58.383) (96.596) 
Number of children < 5 0.738 0.913 -0.175 
 
(0.093) (0.079) (0.125) 
Distance to school (meters) 1558.611 1355.750 202.861 
 
(412.159) (242.108) (446.617) 
Household Head 
   Level of education 0.833 0.855 -0.022 
 
(0.041) (0.030) (0.050) 
Age 45.262 43.362 1.900 
 
(1.187) (1.115) (1.703) 
Male 0.833 0.855 -0.022 
 
(0.041) (0.030) (0.050) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 9.786 9.703 0.083 
 
(0.199) (0.161) (0.258) 
Male 0.500 0.507 -0.007 
 
(0.055) (0.043) (0.070) 
School enrollment 0.774 0.790 -0.016 
 
(0.046) (0.035) (0.057) 
School attendance 0.738 0.630 0.108 
 
(0.048) (0.041) (0.065)* 
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Table A.18. Summary Statistics for non-poor households by treatment status, 2000 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
*, **, *** indicates significance in difference at .01, .05 and .10 levels of significance 
Statistic Control Treatment Difference (C-T) 
Observations 32 52 84 
Household    
Size 6.063 5.769 0.293 
 
(0.438) (0.316) (0.529) 
Expenditures (C$/year) 45374.210 39948.460 5425.756 
 
(3109.612) (1935.752) (3467.402) 
Total expenditures/capita 
(C$/year) 8018.314 7381.045 637.269 
 
(663.095) (340.264) (676.42) 
Food expenditure/capita: 
(C$/year) 5688.464 4739.573 948.890 
 
(431.294) (203.502) (425.688)* 
Number of children < 5 0.625 0.577 0.048 
 
(0.154) (0.111) (0.186) 
Distance to school (meters) 586.429 1481.250 -894.821 
 
(146.76) (263.398) (363.383)** 
Household Head 
   Level of education 0.938 0.846 0.091 
 
(0.043) (0.051) (0.073) 
Age 37.563 41.923 -4.361 
 
(1.528) (1.62) (2.389) 
Male 0.938 0.846 0.091 
 
(0.043) (0.051) (0.073) 
Eligible Children 
   Age 10.156 9.827 0.329 
 
(0.362) (0.245) (0.422) 
Male 0.531 0.596 -0.065 
 
(0.090) (0.069) (0.112) 
School enrollment 0.813 0.827 -0.014 
 
(0.070) (0.053) (0.087) 
School attendance 0.781 0.692 0.089 
 
(0.074) (0.065) (0.101) 
 
